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IV. JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. 78-3-2(3) (j) . 
V. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. Whether the trial court has complied with the Court of 
Appeals' mandate to enter detailed consistent findings on the 
elements required for recovery for unjust enrichment. 
This issue presents a mixed question of fact and law. The 
trial court's factual findings are subject to a "clearly erroneous" 
standard of review under which deference is given to the trial 
court's findings, and disputed evidence is resolved in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's determination. The trial court's 
application of the law to the facts is subject to a "correctness" 
standard under which no deference is given to the trial court's 
decision. State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932 (Utah 1994) . This issue was 
preserved in Appellant's letter to the court dated May 6, 1996 (R. 
1068-70), and in the accompanying Objections to Plaintiff's 
Proposed Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 
1071-86). 
B. Whether there is substantial evidence in the record to 
support the trial court's Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. 
This issue presents a question of fact subject to a "clearly 
erroneous" standard of review under which deference is given to the 
trial court's findings, and disputed evidence is resolved in a 
light most favorable to the trial court's determination. State v. 
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Pena, 869 P. 2d 932. This issue was preserved in Appellants' 
Objections to Plaintiff's Proposed Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. (R. 1071-86). 
C. Whether the trial court's Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law satisfy the elements for recovery in quasi-
contract . 
This issue presents a mixed question of fact and law. The 
trial court's factual findings are subject to a "clearly erroneous" 
standard under which deference is given to the trial court. The 
trial court's application of the law to the facts is subject to a 
"correctness" standard under which no deference should be given to 
the trial court's decision. State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932. This 
issue was preserved in Appellants' Objections to Plaintiff's 
Proposed Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 1071 
at 1081-82) . 
D. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Bailey-
Allen was entitled to an award for unjust enrichment for counting 
and renegotiating the price of the lumber and, if not, whether the 
trial court applied the correct method to determine the amount by 
which Kurzets had been unjustly enriched. 
The issue of whether Bailey-Allen was entitled to an award for 
unjust enrichment presents a mixed question of fact and law. The 
trial court's factual findings are subject to a "clearly erroneous" 
standard under which deference is given to the trial court. The 
trial court's application of the law to the facts is subject to a 
"correctness" standard under which no deference should be given to 
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the trial court's decision. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932. Whether 
a court's theory of recovery is sound is a question of law to be 
reviewed for correctness. Bailey Allen v. Kurzet, 876 P. 2d at 421, 
424; Van Dvke v. Chappell, 818 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1991). This issue 
was preserved in Appellants' Objections to Plaintiff's Proposed 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 1071 at 
1080) . 
E. Whether the portion of the original judgment in favor of 
Kurzets that Bailey-Allen failed to appeal in the first appeal 
should be entered as of October 6, 1992, and whether post-judgment 
interest should accrue on the award from that date. 
This issue presents a question of law subject to a 
"correctness" standard of review. Bailey Allen v. Kurzet, 876 P. 2d 
at 424; State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). This issue was 
preserved in Appellants' Motion for Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc 
and accompanying Memorandum (R. 934-48), and in their Objections to 
Plaintiff's Proposed Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. (R. 1071 at 1083-84). 
F. Whether the trial court erred in failing to impose 
sanctions under Rule 11, after finding from the bench that Bailey-
Allen had no cause to file the pleading that was the subject of 
Kurzets' Rule 11 motion. 
The legal conclusion that no sanctions were warranted is 
subject to a "correctness" standard of review. Barnard v. Sutliff, 
646 P.2d 1227 (Utah 1992); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). The amount and type of sanction to be 
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imposed is subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard. 
Id. This issue was preserved in Appellants' Objections to 
Plaintiff's Proposed Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. (R. 1071 at 1082-83). 
VI. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The text of the rule 
is set forth verbatim in Addendum I, attached hereto. 
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action arose out of a construction contract under which 
appellee Bailey-Allen Company, Inc. ("Bailey-Allen") was to perform 
certain work building a house for appellants ("Kurzets"). The 
parties had several disputes about the project and, eventually, 
Kurzets terminated Bailey-Allen. Bailey-Allen sued Kurzets for 
breach of contract, for damages under the Mechanic's Lien Statute 
and Construction Bond Statute, and for unjust enrichment. Kurzets 
counterclaimed against Bailey-Allen for damages incurred in having 
to correct several construction errors caused by Bailey-Allen. 
Bailey-Allen was awarded damages for unjust enrichment and 
Kurzets were awarded damages for construction errors. The net 
judgment was in favor of Bailey-Allen. The Kurzets appealed the 
judgment to the Court of Appeals which reversed the award to 
Bailey-Allen and instructed the court to enter findings and 
conclusions consistent with the Court of Appeals' opinion. The 
trial court, on June 11, 1996, entered Amended Findings and 
Conclusion and an Amended Judgment. Kurzets again appeal the case, 
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contending that the trial court has failed to follow the Court of 
Appeals' mandate. 
VIII. RELEVANT FACTS 
On or about July 3, 1990, Kurzets and Bailey-Allen entered 
into an agreement (R. 009-011) (hereinafter "Contract"), whereby 
Bailey-Allen as general contractor agreed to oversee the 
construction of Kurzets' residence in Park City, Utah (the 
"Project"). (R. 214-15). The Contract provided, among other 
things, that Bailey-Allen would provide evidence of adequate 
insurance coverage for the Project, that it would act as the 
general contractor, and that it would supervise and direct the 
construction. Id. In return, Kurzets agreed to pay all costs of 
labor and material including twenty-two dollars ($22) per hour the 
hands-on labor of Bailey-Allen's employees and, upon completion of 
the Project, to pay Bailey-Allen one hundred thousand dollars for 
general contractor services of directing and supervising the 
construction. Id. 
On October 2, 1990, Kurzets terminated Bailey-Allen from the 
Project for failing to produce evidence of insurance and for 
failing to adequately perform as general contractor. Bailey-Allen 
filed a mechanic's lien, brought an action to foreclose the lien 
and an action for failure to obtain a construction bond, and sought 
to recover damages under the contract and under a theory of unjust 
enrichment, seeking one hundred thousand dollars in damages as its 
fee for directing and supervising the construction. (R. 001-008) . 
On September 24, 1991, the trial court granted Kurzets' motion for 
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summary judgment on Bailey-Allen's claim for unjust enrichment, and 
claims under the mechanic's lien and construction bond statutes, 
and ordered that the mechanic's lien be discharged. (R. 127-28). 
The remaining contract claim was tried at the bench on 
December 18 and 19, 1991, and on January 30, 1992. (R. 3 05) . During 
the trial, the court sua sponte, reinstated the cause of action for 
unjust enrichment over Kurzets' objection. (R. 543-45) . At the 
conclusion of trial, the court issued its ruling from the bench. 
(R. 797-806). The court instructed Kurzets to submit proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a proposed Judgment 
based on the court's verbal ruling. Id. On October 6, 1992, the 
court adopted Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and entered 
judgment. (R. 214-22) ("Original Findings and Conclusions" and 
"Original Judgment" respectively) (a copy of the Original Findings 
and Conclusions is attached as Addendum A). 
The trial court concluded that Kurzets were not in breach of 
the Contract in any way. (R. 218) . It concluded that Kurzets were 
justified in terminating Bailey-Allen because Bailey-Allen failed 
to provide evidence of insurance as required under the Contract (R. 
216) , and because Bailey-Allen "spent very few hours on the job 
site and did not give the construction project the attention it 
required under the contract and that plaintiff knew Mr. Kurzet 
would expect." (R. 215-17). 
Nevertheless, the trial court awarded Bailey-Allen damages "in 
quantum meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the contract. . ." (R. 
218), reasoning that Kurzets had received a $10,000 benefit from 
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Bailey-Allen's pre-termination services "regardless of whether 
[Bailey-Allen] performed its duties under the contract." (R. 216) . 
The trial court al so awarded Bailey-Allen $5,500.00 based on the 
savings that Bailey-Allen achieved by counting and negotiating the 
price of some lumber that had been delivered to the construction 
site before Kurzets and Bailey-Allen entered into the Contract. (R. 
218) . Finally, Bailey-Allen was awarded its costs, and 
pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on the award. The Original 
Judgment in favor of Bailey-Allen was offset by a judgment in favor 
of Kurzets in the amount of $4,359.00 representing damages due to 
Bailey-Allen's faulty construction and its ordering unnecessary 
materials. (R. 220-222). (Original Judgment, October 6, 1992, 
attached as Addendum B). 
After unsuccessfully moving the trial court to alter or amend 
the Original Judgment (R. 266), Kurzets filed an appeal* (R. 294) . 
Bailey-Allen did not cross-appeal. On the first appeal, Kurzets 
claimed that the court had misapplied the law by awarding damages 
for the contractor's fee and for negotiating the lumber; by 
awarding pre-judgment and post-judgment interest to Bailey-Allen, 
and by failing to award attorney fees to Kurzets for prevailing on 
the mechanic's lien cause of action. (R. 809-815). 
The Court of Appeals reversed the award to Bailey-Allen, 
concluding that it was not entitled to recover damages "on the 
contract" because there was no evidence that it substantially 
performed under the contract. (R. 811(a)). (Opinion of the Utah 
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Court of Appeals, attached as Addendum C) . * The Court also held 
that while an award in quasi-contract might be appropriate, the 
trial court had not entered findings sufficient to allow the Court 
to determine whether recovery was warranted. (R. 812). The Court 
of Appeals also reversed the award to Bailey-Allen of pre-judgment 
interest and held that post-judgment interest, if a judgment was 
awarded on remand, should run only from the date the new judgment 
on remand is entered (R. 813-813 (a)). Finally, the Court of 
Appeals held that Kurzets were entitled to recover attorneys' fees 
for successfully defending Bailey-Allen's cause of action under the 
Mechanic's Lien Statute. (R. 814 (a)). The Court of Appeals did 
not disturb the award of damages to Kurzets that had comprised the 
"offsets" against the judgment in favor of Bailey-Allen. (R. 812) . 
On November 1, 1994, after the case had been remitted to 
district court, Kurzets moved the district court for attorney fees 
and costs pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals. (R. 
844). On November 18, the parties jointly requested a hearing on 
the motion. (R. 877) . 
On November 28, 1994, after the hearing was scheduled, Bailey-
Allen requested a status conference before Judge Wilkinson. At the 
same time, it filed an objection to Kurzets' motion for attorney 
fees and costs and an objection to the scheduled hearing. Bailey-
Allen argued that the Motion for Attorney Fees should be before 
1
 The Court of Appeals' Opinion has been Bates stamped with numbers 8 09 
through 815 of the record. The opinion is double-sided and the reverse side of 
each page has not been stamped. References to pages of the opinion without 
stamped numbers will be designated as (R.809(a)), etc. 
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Judge Wilkinson rather than Judge Glenn Iwasaki who was then 
presiding in Summit County. (R. 855). 
On December 29, 1994, Judge Iwasaki heard argument on Bailey-
Allen's objections to Kurzets' motion for attorney fees. The court 
decided that the matter of attorney fees was not unique to the 
knowledge of Judge Wilkinson, and that it would hear the motion. 
(R. 1182-83) . On January 23, 1995, the court entered findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and judgment in favor of Kurzets for 
attorney fees and costs under the mechanic's lien statute and the 
bond statute in the amount of $1,937.50 plus interest. (R. 917). 
On May 12, 1995, because Bailey-Allen had not taken any action 
to bring the remanded case before the trial court, Kurzets 
requested from the clerk of the court a transcript of the portion 
of the Original Judgment in favor of Kurzets that had been entered 
on October 6, 1992, and that had been offset against the judgment 
for Bailey-Allen. (R. 919-25). The clerk would not issue the 
transcript of judgment either because it could not determine from 
the record whether the award in favor of Kurzets survived the 
appeal or because it believed the case was still on appeal. (R. 
919, 930) . On July 25, 1995, therefore, Kurzets filed a Motion for 
Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc and supporting Memorandum 
requesting the court to enter judgment for Kurzets in the amount of 
$4,359.00 as of October 6, 1992, together with interest running 
from that date. (R. 934-947). 
On August 25, 1995, in response to Kurzets' Motion for Entry 
of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc, Bailey-Allen filed two motions, one for 
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Entry of Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment Pursuant to the Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals (R. 
964) , and another to Set Aside the Prior Order Dismissing the 
Mechanic's Lien Cause of Action and Resulting Judgment for Attorney 
Fees in Favor of Defendants. (R. 962) . Kurzets replied to Bailey-
Allen's motions on September 18, 1995, and at the same time moved 
for sanctions under Rule 11. (R. 997). Kurzets contended that 
Bailey-Allen's Motion to Set Aside the Prior Order Dismissing 
Mechanic's Lien Cause of Action was not warranted by any existing 
law or good faith argument for extending the law. (R. 997-1003). 
Bailey-Allen subsequently withdrew the motion (R. 1008), but not 
before Kurzets had filed a brief in opposition and a Motion for 
Sanctions. Kurzets requested that they be awarded their fees and 
costs incurred in responding to Bailey-Allen's Motion to Set Aside 
and in preparing the Motion for Sanctions. (R. 1002). 
On November 21, 1995, the court (Judge Wilkinson presiding) 
heard oral argument on all pending motions. (R. 1010-1064). The 
court granted Bailey Allen's Motion for Entry of Additional 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, denied Kurzets' Motion for 
Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc on the grounds that it was moot, 
and noted that the Motion to Set Aside the Prior Order Dismissing 
the Mechanic's Lien Cause of Action had been withdrawn. (R. 1060). 
With respect to Kurzets' Motion for Sanctions, the court 
agreed that Bailey-Allen's counsel had no cause to bring the motion 
before the court. (R. 1060). The court, however, also believed 
that Kurzets had improperly brought their motion for attorney fees 
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before Judge Iwasaki. (R. 1061). Instead of awarding Kurzets' 
their attorney fees or imposing other appropriate sanctions, the 
court determined that the perceived impropriety of Kurzets bringing 
the motion before Judge Iwasaki would "offset" Bailey-Allen's 
violation of Rule 11. (R. 1061). The court denied the Motion for 
Sanctions. (R. 1061) (a copy of the transcript of the trial court's 
ruling on the Motion for Sanctions is attached as Addendum H). 
At the close of the hearing on November 21, 1995, the court 
instructed Bailey-Allen to prepare proposed Amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, proposed Amended Judgment, proposed 
Order Denying Motion for Sanctions and for Entry of Judgment Nunc 
Pro Tunc, and proposed Order Satisfying Prior Judgment Re: 
Attorney's Fees. (R. 1112-1129). When Bailey-Allen submitted 
their proposed Amended Findings and Conclusions, Kurzets filed 
detailed objections (R. 1071-1087), and submitted their own 
proposed Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
proposed Amended Judgment (R. 1088-1101) (Kurzets' Proposed Amended 
Findings and Conclusions and Proposed Amended Judgment are attached 
as Addenda F and G respectively). 
On June 11, 1996, a very brief hearing was held on the 
parties' proposed Amended Findings and Conclusions (R. 1132-114 9). 
At the close of the hearing, the court entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law virtually verbatim as submitted by Bailey-Allen. 
(The Amended Findings and Conclusions are attached as Addendum D). 
The court also entered Bailey-Allen's proposed Amended Judgment, 
and an Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Entry of Judgment Nunc 
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Pro Tunc and their Motion for Sanctions. (R. 1124-29) (the Amended 
Judgment is attached as Addendum E). 
On July 5, 1996, defendants filed a timely Notice of Appeal 
from the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
Amended Judgment, the Order Satisfying Prior Judgment re: 
Attorney's Fees, and the Order Denying Defendants' Motion for 
Sanctions and denying its Motion for Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro 
Tunc. 
IX. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Kurzets appeal from the Amended Judgment on six grounds. A 
summary of each argument follows: 
A. On the first appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
award to Bailey-Allen because, due to the inconsistencies in the 
trial court's Original Findings, it could not tell whether the 
award was supported by the evidence. It remanded the case for the 
trial court to enter "detailed, consistent" findings. (R. 812). 
Because the trial court preserved the Original Findings and added 
to them the Amended Findings, the inconsistencies still exist that 
led the Court of Appeals to reverse the award in the first 
instance. The Amended Judgment for Bailey-Allen is still without 
support in the Findings and Conclusions and the trial court has 
failed to abide by the mandate. 
B. The Amended Findings of Fact are not supported by 
evidence in the record. In an attempt to salvage the award to 
Bailey-Allen and to articulate some factual basis for it, the court 
entered the proposed Amended Findings and Conclusions as submitted 
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by Bailey-Allen. Several of those Amended Findings are simply not 
supportable by any evidence in the record. Others, although there 
may be very scant evidence in support, are not supported by 
substantial credible evidence when the record is viewed as a whole. 
C. The trial court failed to follow the Court of Appeals' 
instruction to allow recovery on Bailey-Allen's claim only if all 
three elements for recovery in quasi-contract were satisfied. (R. 
812 (citing Davies v. Olsen, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah App. 1987)). 
The first element under Davies has not been satisfied because the 
trial court, as it did in its Original Findings, failed to find 
that Bailey-Allen conferred any benefit on Kurzets. Likewise, the 
second element under Davies has not been satisfied because there is 
insufficient evidence in the record to suggest that Kurzets 
realized or appreciated any benefit from Bailey-Allen's involvement 
in the Project. Finally, the third element has not been satisfied 
because Bailey-Allen conferred no benefit on Kurzets. 
Consequently, it would not be unjust to allow Kurzets to retain the 
value of the construction completed during Bailey-Allen's tenure 
without paying Bailey-Allen. 
D. The trial court erred in finding that Bailey-Allen was 
entitled to an award for unjust enrichment with respect to its 
services in counting and negotiating the price of lumber. The 
Court of Appeals directed the trial court to determine whether 
counting and negotiating the price of lumber fell within the 
services Bailey-Allen was supposed to perform under the Contract. 
Although the trial court concluded that such services did not come 
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within the Contract, there is absolutely no basis for that 
decision. In addition, the amount of the award to Bailey-Allen, 
which should have been based on the value of the benefit conferred, 
was simply an arbitrary number. There is no basis in the law or in 
the facts for the court's decision that Bailey-Allen is entitled to 
one-half of the amount it saved Kurzets. 
E. The trial court erred in denying Kurzet's Motion for 
Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc. Bailey-Allen never appealed from 
the judgment in favor of Kurzets. It became res judicata or the 
law of the case, therefore, when the time for appeal had run. The 
decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the award to Bailey-
Allen had no effect on the portion of the judgment in favor of 
Kurzets. The trial court should have entered judgment in favor of 
Kurzets as of October 6, 1992, the date the Original Judgment was 
entered. 
F. The trial court erred in denying Kurzet's Motion for 
Sanctions under Rule 11. The trial court agreed that Bailey-
Allen's motion to reinstate the Mechanic's Lien cause of action was 
without cause. Yet, it did not enter a finding that Rule 11 had 
been violated and it did not impose sanctions. The courts' reason 
for not doing so was that the Rule 11 violation was offset by the 
supposedly improper conduct of Kurzets' counsel in bringing the 
motion for attorney fees before Judge Iwasaki. The trial court 
erred in failing to enter a finding that Rule 11 had been violated. 
The trial court also erred in failing to impose sanctions because 
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Rule 11 provides that when a violation has been found, sanctions 
are mandatory. 
X. ARGUMENT 
A. The Trial Court's Amended Findings of Fact Are Contrary 
to the Court of Appeals7 Mandate to Enter Consistent 
Findings. 
When a case has been remanded, the trial court must adhere to 
"both the letter and the spirit of the [Appellate Court's] mandate, 
taking into account the Appellate Court's opinion and the 
circumstances it embraces." Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P. 2d 
1034, 1038 (Utah 1995). The Appellate Court's mandate is 
inflexible and must be followed even when the trial court believes 
there may be a better resolution of the issues. Id. 
In the present case, the Court of Appeals held that the trial 
court had not entered findings sufficient to support an award in 
quasi-contract. (R. 812). In that respect, it found two 
fundamental deficiencies in the trial court's Original Findings and 
Conclusions. First, the trial court did not specifically address 
the three requirements for recovery in unjust enrichment as set out 
in Davies v. Olsen, 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah App. 1987) . (R. 
811(a)). (See discussion below at Section X.D.) Second, the trial 
court's Original Findings were plagued with internal 
inconsistencies. (R. 812). 
The Court of Appeals found it inconsistent that although 
Bailey-Allen apparently had failed to perform, it had been awarded 
$10,000 as the value of the benefit it conferred on Kurzets. 
Likewise, the finding that Bailey-Allen conferred a benefit of 
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$10,000 "regardless of whether it performed its duties under the 
contract" indicated to the Court of Appeals that the "10% of the 
work performed during Bailey-Allen's tenure was not necessarily due 
to its presence or performance." (R. 812). Due to these 
inconsistencies, the Court of Appeals could not determine whether 
the facts would support an award in unjust enrichment. (R.812). 
The mandate of the Court of Appeals, therefore, was as 
follows: 
We therefore reverse the award and remand for 
an analysis and findings under the standard 
articulated in Davies. The trial court should 
make detailed, consistent findings on each of 
the three required elements and allow recovery 
only if all three are satisfied. 
(R. 812) (emphasis added). The trial court has not been able to 
comply with the mandate to enter consistent, detailed findings. 
The reasons for this failure are (a) the trial court's decision not 
to supersede its Original Findings and Conclusions which were 
already inconsistent; and (2) its attempt to find evidence 
supporting for an award to Bailey-Allen where none exists. 
When Bailey-Allen submitted its proposed Amended Findings and 
Conclusions it proposed that they "supersede the original Findings 
and Conclusions." (R. 1113). The trial court, however, was 
uncomfortable abandoning the Original Findings, and ultimately 
ruled that the Original Findings must stand. (R. 113 5). 2 
2
 The court stated: 
I don't know that these supersede the original findings. 
I think that they're there. Nothing takes or does away 
with them. I think these are additional or corrected 
findings, but I don't think you can say they "supersede" 
them ... 
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The operat ive findings of fact on t h i s appeal, therefore , are 
the Original Findings and the Amended Findings.3 The Original 
Findings were insuf f i c ien t to support an award because they were 
i n t e r n a l l y incons i s t en t . The Amended Findings are even more 
inadequate because they not only preserve the incons is tenc ies , but 
they d i r e c t l y contradic t the evidence. 
The f i r s t finding tha t i s inconsis tent with the award to 
Bailey-Allen i s the statement in the Original Findings tha t 
11
 [Bailey-Allen] spent very few hours on the job s i t e and did not 
give the construct ion project the a t t en t ion i t required. . . " (R. 
217) .4 Without abandoning tha t Finding, the court adopted the 
(R. 1135). Af ter hea r ing some d i s cus s ion , a f t e r r e fe rence t o the Court of 
Appeals ' op in ion , and a f t e r the argument of counse l , the t r i a l cour t decided t o 
s u b s t i t u t e the word " c l a r i f y " for "supersede" . The cour t s t a t e d : "I s t i l l d o n ' t 
f e e l comfortable wi th the word ' s u p e r s e d e s . ' I 'm going t o l e t i t go wi th 
" ' c l a r i f i e d ' . " (R. 1137). 
3
 Because the t r i a l cour t determined t h a t the Amended Findings d id not 
supersede the Or ig ina l F indings , i t i s unnecessary for Kurzets t o argue on t h i s 
appeal t h a t the t r i a l cour t was prec luded from abandoning i t s Or ig ina l F ind ings . 
Neve r the l e s s , t h e r e i s a u t h o r i t y t o support the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t the law of the 
case d o c t r i n e a p p l i e s t o p rec lude r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of f ind ings of f ac t from which 
no appeal i s t aken . See Envirotech Corp. v . Cal lahan, 872 P. 2d 487 (Ut. App. 
1994) (when f ind ings of f ac t a re not chal lenged on appeal , the Court of Appeals 
assumes t h a t t he f a c t s a re supported by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence in the r e c o r d ) ; 
Thurston v . Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037-39 (Utah 1995) ( c i t i n g United 
S t a t e s v. R ive r ra -Mar t inez , 931 Fed. 2d 148 (1st C i r . ) , c e r t , denied, 502 U.S. 
862, 112 S. Ct. 184, 116 L.Ed. 2d 145 (1991)) ("The excep t iona l c i rcumstances 
under which c o u r t s have reopened i s s u e s p r ev ious ly decided a re narrowly de f ined : 
(1) when t h e r e has been an i n t e rven ing change of c o n t r o l l i n g a u t h o r i t y ; (2) when 
new evidence has become a v a i l a b l e ; or (3) when the cour t i s convinced t h a t i t s 
p r i o r d e c i s i o n was c l e a r l y erroneous and would work a manifest i n j u s t i c e . " ) ; 
Robert E. Lee & Co. v . Commission of Publ ic Works of the Ci ty of G r e e n v i l l e , 14 9 
S.E. 2d 59, 62 ( S . C 1966) ( t r i a l cour t cannot make f a c t u a l f ind ings which a r e 
" n e c e s s a r i l y c o n t r a r y t o h i s p rev ious r u l i n g " ) ; Haines P i p e l i n e Cons t ruc t ion , 
I n c . v . Montana Power Company, 876 P. 2d 632, 637-38 (Mont. 1994) ( e r r o r for 
d i s t r i c t cour t t o d i s r e g a r d and contravene on remand f ind ings of f a c t not 
r eve r sed by the Court of Appeals ) . 
4
 In i t s Or ig ina l Findings and Conclusions, the Court determined: 
6. The Court concludes t h a t Defendants were j u s t i f i e d in 
t e r m i n a t i n g P l a i n t i f f ' s s e r v i c e s because P l a i n t i f f spent 
very few hours on the job s i t e and d id not g ive the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o j e c t the a t t e n t i o n t h a t i t r equ i r ed 
under the Contract and t h a t P l a i n t i f f knew Mr. Kurzet 
270166 1 17 
following Amended Findings tha t attempt to reach the opposite 
conclusion: 
14. The Court finds tha t Mr. Richard Allen of 
the P l a in t i f f v i s i t e d the construct ion s i t e 
p r a c t i c a l l y every day for some period of time, 
by h is own testimony. 
15. The Court finds Mr. Allen was a lso 
avai lable on his mobile phone when not on s i t e 
and made or received da i ly c a l l s concerning 
the job. 
16. The Court finds tha t Mr. Allen a lso spent 
considerable time at h is home in the evening 
making c a l l s , s e t t i n g up appointments, and 
contact ing other contractors in connection 
with the job. 
17. The Court finds tha t during the three 
month period tha t the Contract was in e f fec t , 
P l a in t i f f performed general contractor 
se rv ices , including the h i r ing of 
subcontractors , overseeing the work of 
subcontractors , ge t t ing bids on r e t a in ing 
wal ls , windows, cabinets and other items, 
meeting with people, including bui lding 
inspectors , and general ly coordinating work on 
the job. 
(R. 1116-17). As discussed below, these Amended Findings are not 
supported by the evidence. Even if they were, however, the only 
conclusion tha t can be drawn from them tha t i s cons is tent with the 
Original Findings i s tha t although Mr. Allen v i s i t e d the s i t e 
would expec t . 
(R. 217) . In i t s Amended Findings and Conclusions, the t r i a l cour t omi t ted any 
r e f e r ence t o Kurzets being j u s t i f i e d in t e rmina t ing Ba i l ey -Al len because i t spent 
very few hours on the job s i t e . (R. 1115) . The reason for the omission was t h a t 
the cour t could not r e c a l l f ind ing t h a t Ba i ley-Al len had f a i l e d t o put in the 
hours t h a t were r equ i r ed t o do the j o b . (R. 1013, 1032-33) . In Kurze t s ' 
Objec t ions t o the Proposed Findings and Conclusions Kurzets po in t ed out the t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s r u l i n g from the bench a t the c lose of t r i a l where the cour t s t a t e d t h a t 
Ba i l ey -Al l en was on the job "very few hours" (R. 1081, quo t i n g R. 798) . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , when Kurzets7 ob j ec t i on came up a t the hear ing on o b j e c t i o n s t o the 
f i n d i n g s , the cour t ove r ru l ed the ob j ec t i on and en te red the Amended F ind ing . (R. 
1144) . 
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nearly every day, made and received calls on his mobile phone and 
at home in the evenings, and performed "general contractor 
services," he nevertheless was on the job site very few hours and 
did not give the project the attention it required. The Court on 
this appeal, therefore, faces the same internal inconsistencies as 
on the first appeal. An award for unjust enrichment is not 
warranted under these facts. 
The second persistent inconsistency in the trial court's 
findings stems from Original Finding No. 8 which states: 
8. The Court finds, that about 10% of the 
construction project was completed while 
plaintiff was general contractor and, based on 
that percentage, defendants received a benefit 
from plaintiff's pre-termination services in 
the amount of $10,000 regardless of whether 
plaintiff performed its duties under the 
contract. 
(R. 216) (emphasis added). 
In discussing the inconsistency in the foregoing statement, 
the Court of Appeals stated: 
The Kurzets argue persuasively that Bailey-
Allen does not satisfy the first element of 
Davies because Bailey-Allen conferred no 
benefit upon them. The trial court seemed to 
agree, at least in theory, finding that the 
10% of the work completed during Bailey-
Allen's tenure was not necessarily due to its 
presence or performance. 
(R. 812). The trial court easily could have corrected the 
inconsistency by directly identifying the benefit that Bailey-Allen 
supposedly conferred on Kurzets, assuming the record would support 
such a finding. The trial court, however, entered the following 
Amended Finding: 
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18. The Court finds that during the time 
Plaintiff was the general contractor of the 
project, the residence progressed from a 
concrete slab to a point where the roof was 
ready to be completed on the multi-story [sic] 
residence. Based upon the testimony of 
Defendants' expert witness, the Court finds 
that 10% of the construction project 
contemplated by the Contract was completed 
during the time Plaintiff was general 
contractor. 
(R. 1117) (emphasis added). Again, the trial court did not find 
that Bailey-Allen was responsible for the 10% completion as it 
could not under the facts in evidence. It merely found, as it did 
in the Original Findings, that 10% of the construction was 
completed during the three-month period. The Amended Finding does 
not support an award in favor of Bailey-Allen. Instead, it 
accurately implies that it was not Bailey-Allen that conferred the 
benefit of the 10% completion. 
The trial court has not followed the Court of Appeals' mandate 
and the inconsistencies remain. Even assuming the Amended Findings 
are supported by substantial evidence, which they are not, it 
cannot be determined from the Findings whether the award to Bailey-
Allen was warranted. The trial court's award to Bailey-Allen, 
therefore, should be reversed and the court should be instructed to 
enter judgment in favor of Kurzets. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Entering Findings That Weren't 
Supported by the Evidence. 
A trial court's factual findings are reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard. State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 939 (Utah 
1994) . Although the standard imposes a heavy burden on an 
appellant, findings must be reversed if they are "against the clear 
20 
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weight of evidence or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Cal 
Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah 
1995) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)) . In 
the present case, even considering all of the evidence in support 
of the trial court's Amended Findings, and viewing those findings 
in the light most favorable to the court, the Amended Findings 
discussed below are so lacking in support that they are against the 
clear weight of evidence. They are, therefore, clearly erroneous. 
See Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, Inc., 890 P.2d 1024, 
1028 (Utah 1995) (findings may be found clearly erroneous when 
appellant has marshalled evidence in support of the findings and 
yet they are so lacking in support as to be against the clear 
weight of evidence). 
The Amended Findings are the trial court's attempt to 
find ground on which to retreat from its Original Findings that the 
plaintiff spent very few hours on the job site, and that 10% of the 
project was completed regardless of Bailey-Allen's presence. The 
series of statements in the Amended Finding's about Mr. Allen's 
presence on the project, however, and about the tasks he performed 
as general contractor, are simply not based on the evidence. 
1. Amended Finding of Fact No. 14 Is Not Supported by 
the Evidence. 
Amended Finding No. 14 addresses the frequency with 
which Mr. Allen visited the construction site. It states: 
14. Court finds that during the three 
month period that the Contract was in 
effect, Michael Kent, Plaintiff was on 
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the construction site approximately 
thirty (30) hours per week. In addition, 
Mr. Richard Allen of the Plaintiff 
visited the construction site practically 
every day for some period of time, by his 
own testimony. 
(R. 1116 (emphasis added)).5 
This finding is not supported by any evidence, even by 
Mr. Allen's own testimony. Mr. Allen did not state that he was 
personally on the site every day. When asked, he was vague about 
the subject. (R. 441). His testimony was as follows: 
Q. For yourself, what type of time did you spend on the job 
in terms say of day-by-day? 
A. It varied. 
Q. How did it vary? 
A. Some days I spent 10-hours on the job, some days I would 
be there an hour or two. 
Q. And this was weekly, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Some days you missed? 
A. Yes. 
o. That was because you had what, other jobs going on? 
A. Yes, Mike would have been there. 
5
 The words "by his own testimony" were added at the insistence of the 
court. The court stated: 
My recollection is that that is the testimony that was 
given. Now, I probably did not find that Mr. Allen 
visited the site every day. I think he indicated --
Let's see, Kent is the one that was there; this is 
Allen. I think there was a correct statement, which his 
testimony was regarding, but I didn't necessarily find 
he visited every day, and I would ask that be corrected. 
(R. 1138-39) . The "correction" was to add "by his own testimony" to a statement 
that was clearly false by anyone's testimony. 
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(R. 441) . There is apparently no other evidence that Mr. Allen 
visited the site every day. 
To the contrary, Mr. Kurzet testified that Mr. Allen was 
"seldom there" (R. 507) or "very seldom" there. (R. 515). Mr. 
Kurzet stated that he could recall a period of approximately four 
or five weeks where he never saw Mr. Allen on the site once. (Id.) 
During the period from July, 1990, to the end of September, 1990, 
he said Mr. Allen was "almost never" on the job site. (R. 656) . 
The testimony of Andrew Parker, the framing contractor who 
spent 40-50 hours a week on the job (R. 694), was similar: 
Q. . . . as to Mr. Allen, how many hours a day would you 
think you say Mr. Allen on the job site? 
A. There was a lot less frequency. I guess he was running 
around coordinating other jobs, so if he showed up at 
all, it would be, you know, under a half an hour. 
(R. 695). 
Another workman on the job, Ken Anderson, agreeing with 
Bailey-Allen's counsel on cross-examination, testified that Mr. 
Allen might have averaged one hour per day. (R. 744) . He did not 
testify that Mr. Allen was there every day, he only admitted that 
his time might have averaged one hour per day. 
There is apparently no other evidence about the number of days 
or length of time that Mr. Allen spent on the job site. The 
court's finding that Mr. Allen was there "practically every day" is 
simply not supported by the record. More importantly, it cannot be 
said that Mr. Allen spent the time necessary to take credit for the 
10% of the project that was completed. The only reasonable 
conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence is that Mr. Allen 
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was on the job site "very few" hours," not frequently enough or 
long enough to function as general contractor or to give the 
project the attention it required. 
2. Finding of Fact No. 15 Is Not Supported by 
Substantial Evidence. 
Amended Finding No. 15 states: "[T]he Court finds that Mr. 
Allen was also available on his mobile phone when not on-site and 
made or received daily calls concerning the job." (R. 1116). 
Kurzets do not dispute that Mr. Allen had a mobile phone. But 
he did not make or receive daily calls concerning the job. The 
evidence in support of the finding consists of Mr. Allen's own 
testimony and Mr. Kent's testimony. Mr. Allen testified on direct 
as follows: 
Q. Alright. Did you, in fact, have a mobile phone by which 
you could be reached by those who were on-site? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did they call you often? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On an average week, how many calls would you get yourself 
from someone on-site asking a question? Before you 
answer that, I'll remind you that, of course, Mr. Kent 
was on the site for considerable amount of time. He was, 
was he not? 
A. If Mike was on the site, they wouldn't call me. 
Q. How many calls a week, if you know, did you average from 
Mr. Parker during that 12-week period? 
A. Probably two. 
Q. Two a week? 
A. Yes. 
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(R. 754). Two calls a week is not "daily," and Mr. Allen's level 
of communication does not demonstrate any significant involvement 
with the project. The only other evidence in support of this 
finding is Mr. Kent's vague testimony: "Richard was always 
talking to [Mr. Kurzet] . I never really talked to him on the 
phone. Richard spent a lot of phone time." (R. 490). 
There is substantial evidence to contradict the finding. Mr. 
Kurzet stated that sometimes he was able to get in touch with 
Bailey-Allen with one phone call, but sometimes he couldn't get 
them until the evening. (R. 515-16) . Bailey-Allen was not easy to 
reach on the telephone and, although Mr. Allen had a mobile phone 
number, Mr. Kurzet could only reach somebody "about a third of the 
time" he tried. (R. 616-17). 
Andrew Parker testified that even though Bailey-Allen had a 
mobile phone, it was "very difficult to often communicate [with] 
them, but on occasion I would get through . . . " (R. 731). Mr. 
Parker had a mobile phone on the site and he made attempts to call 
Mr. Allen when he needed to ask him a question. (R. 731) . 
Infrequently, Bailey-Allen would come to the site in response to 
one of Mr. Parker's phone calls. (R. 739). Generally, Mr. Parker 
found it difficult to communicate with Bailey-Allen, and when he 
could it was not helpful, either because Bailey-Allen did not have 
the answer to his question (R. 732), or because it was the kind of 
problem that could not be discussed on the phone. (R. 73 8) ("It's 
pretty hard to explain a blueprint problem over the phone"). There 
were occasions when Mr. Parker could have called Mr. Allen but he 
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had no confidence that Mr. Allen would have the answer to his 
question. (R. 731-32). 
There is apparently no other evidence concerning Mr. Allen's 
use of the mobile phone. The only reasonable conclusion that can 
be drawn from the record is that Mr. Allen was not accessible when 
he was needed, either in person or by telephone. The court's 
finding that he was available on the mobile phone and received 
daily calls concerning the job is not supported by the evidence. 
3. Amended Finding of Fact No. 16 Is Not Supported By 
the Evidence. 
Amended Finding of Fact No. 16 states as follows: 
The Court finds that Mr. Allen also spent 
considerable time at his home in the evening 
making calls, setting up appointments in 
contacting other contractors in connection 
with the job. 
(R. 1117). Again, there is no evidence to support this finding. 
Mr. Kent (not Mr. Allen) offered the following testimony under 
examination by Bailey-Allen's counsel: 
Q. Did much of your coordination -- or did any of your 
coordination efforts occur at night on the telephone; for 
example, as opposed to being on-site? 
A. Oh, yes. Most subcontractors can't be reached during the 
day because they're on the job. You do most of your 
coordinating with telephone contacts at nighttime. 
Q. The estimate you gave counsel of 3 5 to 40 hours a week, 
was that on-site time? 
A. On-site time. 
Q. In addition to that, you spent other time at home at 
night on the telephone coordinating? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In an average day, how much time would that take? 
270166 1 2t> 
A. Probably and hour or two; however, Richard was always 
talking to Stan. I never really talked to him on the 
phone. Richard spent a lot of time on the phone. 
(R. 489-90). This testimony does not support the court's Finding 
No. 15. It was Mr. Kent, not Mr. Allen, that made evening calls if 
any were made. Time was billable at $22.00 per hour. Mr. Kent was 
not qualified to act as a general contractor. (R. 465). Richard 
Allen was the licensed contractor. (R. 366). Mr. Kent would not 
have been entitled to any of the general contractor's fee even if 
Bailey-Allen had completed the project because his time was 
billable at $22.00 per hour. 
In addition, Mr. Kent didn't state that he made any phone 
calls, only that "you," meaning most general contractors, make most 
of their phone calls at night. (R. 489). Mr. Kent may have made 
some phone calls, but the record does not say who he called, on 
what occasions, for what purpose, what appointments if any were set 
up or whether any "general contracting" work was accomplished at 
all. There is no evidence for the statement in Amended Finding No. 
16 that Mr. Allen spent considerable time in the evenings making 
calls. 
4. Amended Finding No. 17 Is Not Supported By the 
Evidence. 
Amended Finding No. 17 states as follows: 
The Court finds that during the three month 
period that the Contract was in effect, 
Plaintiff performed general contractor 
services, including the hiring of 
subcontractors, overseeing the work of 
subcontractors, getting bids on retaining 
walls, window, cabinets and other items, 
meeting with people, including building 
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inspectors, and generally coordinating the 
work on the job. 
(R. 1117). This statement generally describes the services that 
Bailey-Allen claimed it performed as general contractor. It 
identifies four categories of tasks: (1) hiring and overseeing the 
work of subcontractors; (2) getting bids; (3) meeting with people; 
and (4) generally coordinating the work on the job. There is 
little doubt that Bailey-Allen "performed general contractor 
services" of some description during the three months that the 
Contract was in effect. The evidence indicates, however, that 
Bailey-Allen did not perform all of the services stated in Amended 
Finding No. 17. When it did, for the most part, Bailey-Allen's 
involvement resulted in substandard work. (R. 3 75-76). 
Mr. Allen explained the services that Bailey-Allen provided as 
follows: 
A. We arranged with -- along with Stan Kurzet -- to get a 
framing subcontractor started. We arranged for and 
supervised excavation and back filling. We talked with 
Stan Kurzet and arranged, with his approval, the masonry 
subcontractors to start on the fireplaces and masonry. 
We had a plumber do some preliminary work. We worked 
with the steel erectors, had them complete the erection 
of the steel framework. We arranged for site 
organization, site clean-up, talked with him on getting 
an electrical subcontractor and had many discussions 
about that. 
Q. Did you have anything to do with ordering of materials or 
supplies during the time you were on the project? 
A. Yes, when we got there there was a substantial amount of 
material on the site that was left there from the 
previous builder. We counted that up for him, and gave 
him a price we thought would be the worth for that to 
settle with the old contractor. 
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(R. 339-40). Mr. Allen offered substantially the same testimony on 
rebuttal-direct but also testified that he hired concrete cutters 
and cement subcontractors and placed an order for windows. (R. 
752) . He was "in the process of" ordering cabinets and roofing, 
but apparently never did. (Id.) He also testified that he 
"scheduled and coordinated with the masonry and framing 
subcontractors" the inspections performed by the city. (R. 752-
53) . 
a. Hiring and Overseeing Subcontractors, 
Mr. Allen arranged for an excavator, a concrete cutter, a 
concrete subcontractor, a plumber, and a steel contractor. (R. 
116) . 
Kurzets were pleased with the excavator who performed the 
backfill on the project. (R. 428, 601). The record does not 
indicate the cost of the work or its value to the project. The 
record also is silent on the concrete cutter's work except for Mr. 
Allen's testimony that there was "a lot of concrete cutting." (R. 
426-27). 
Mr. Allen hired a plumber once during the three-month period. 
(R. 423-25, 652, 711). The plumber installed a toilet, a sink and 
a hose-bib, and he cut off several floor drains in the basement 
where they protruded above the cement slab. (R. 425, 652). He 
worked for one day and a half, and the bill for his services was 
about $1,200. There were no complaints about the work, but it was 
insignificant to the Project. (R. 652, 711) . 
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Bailey-Allen also hired a steel subcontractor to install some 
beams. (R. 427) . The only testimony about the steel work was from 
the framing subcontractor who observed that the steel beams were 
incorrectly placed and that they had to be removed and re-welded. 
(R. 696). 
The only subcontractor hired by Bailey-Allen to perform 
significant work on the project was the concrete subcontractor. 
Bailey-Allen supervised its work in pouring trenches, a retaining 
wall and stairs. (R. 426-27) . Mr. Allen admitted that the 
retaining wall was out of square and the concrete was too wet and 
blew out the forms. (R. 435-39) . Damages in favor of Kurzet's to 
repair the retaining wall are included in the court's Original 
Judgment and its Amended Judgment (R. 218-19, 1121, 1126) . 
Although Mr. Allen apparently did not acknowledge it in his 
testimony, the stairs were also defective. (R. 487-8, 712-14) . 
Kurzet's were awarded damages for having to repair them. (R. 219, 
1126). In short, the concrete subcontractor that Bailey-Allen 
hired performed substandard work and Bailey-Allen's oversight of 
that work was inadequate. 
Mr. Allen talked to an electrician about doing some electrical 
work, but the electrician was not available. (R. 424) . He thought 
Mr. Kurzet ultimately hired the electrician, although he didn't 
know for sure. (R. 119) . Mr. Allen did not recall any electrical 
work being done while he was on the job. (R. 119, 711). 
Bailey-Allen did not hire some of the subcontractors that it 
claimed to have hired. The framing subcontractor was hired by Mr. 
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Kurzet and began working several days before Bailey-Allen began 
working on the job. (R. 511-12). Although Mr. Kurzet ostensibly 
gave Bailey-Allen the choice to retain the framing subcontractor, 
the "choice" was a test to see whether Bailey-Allen would make a 
sound decision and hire Andrew Parker as the framing subcontractor. 
(R. 648, 431) . Kurzets also hired the mason. (R. 428-29) . 
The trial court's Amended Finding No. 17 is misleading to the 
extent it implies that Bailey-Allen hired the subcontractors who 
completed 10% of the Project. At best, Kurzets avoided a loss on 
the work of the cement contractor and realized little benefit from 
the others. The subcontractors who significantly advanced the 
construction during Bailey-Allen's tenure were not hired by Bailey-
Allen. 
b. Meeting With People, Including Building 
Inspectors. 
In addition to hiring subcontractors, Finding No. 17 states 
that Mr. Allen "met with people" and "generally coordinated" the 
work on the job. Mr. Allen testified that he arranged for city 
inspectors to conduct perhaps a dozen on-site inspections. (R. 752-
53) . He also met "occasionally" with the architect and less 
frequently with the engineer. (R. 430-31) . The architect testified 
that he met with Mr. Allen only three or four times over the three 
month period and met with Mr. Kent even less frequently. (R. 671-
72). Later, he qualified his answer and stated that he would say 
"maybe more than four, but surely less than ten" occasions (R. 
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676) .6 The record does not demonstrate Mr. Allen "met with people11 
frequently or even regularly, or that his meetings contributed 
significantly to advancing the work. 
c. Getting Bids, 
Mr. Allen ordered some mater ia ls for the project and arranged 
for a crane to be on the s i t e . (R. 432-34). He placed an order 
for windows and one order for lumber. (R. 443) . Kurzets were 
awarded damages for Bai ley-Allen 's mistake in ordering the lumber. 
(R. 652, 714-30, 1126) . Bailey-Allen offered to obtain competitive 
bids for the mason, but Mr. Kurzet had already hired the mason. (R. 
428-29) . Mr. Allen suggested, without ac tua l ly s t a t i n g i t , tha t he 
may have obtained bids on cabinets and roofing, but orders were 
never placed for those mate r ia l s . (R. 752). 
d. Generally Coordinating the Work on the Job. 
Mr. Al len ' s own testimony contains with references about how 
he "coordinated the work on the job ." ( e .g . , R. 752-53). For the 
most pa r t , however, h is testimony i s se l f - se rv ing and inaccura te . 
As discussed above, the evidence shows tha t Mr. Allen was not 
involved and not ef fec t ive at coordinating the work. As the t r i a l 
court observed from the bench at the end of t r i a l , Bailey-Allen was 
not on the s i t e and was not ge t t ing the job done. (R. 801). 
Mr. Allen was very infrequently on s i t e as the pro jec t was 
evolving. He could not keep abreast of i t , or take i n i t i a t i v e in 
6
 Andrew Parker , on the o the r hand, met with the a r c h i t e c t " p r e t t y much 
every a f te rnoon a f t e r work." (R. 700). The meetings involved Mr. Kurzet bu t , 
t o Mr. P a r k e r ' s r e c o l l e c t i o n n e i t h e r Richard Al len nor Michael Kent ever met wi th 
the framer a t the a r c h i t e c t ' s o f f i c e . (R. 700-01) . This corresponds wi th Mr. 
A l l e n ' s tes t imony who never r e c a l l s meeting with the a r c h i t e c t on framing r e l a t e d 
q u e s t i o n s . (R. 434) . 
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performing his duties. The only thing he could do was exactly what 
Mr. Kurzet told him to do. (R. 753). Even then, Mr. Kurzet felt 
that Bailey-Allen was seldom responsive to his directives and not 
on the job site long enough to adequately do his job. (R. 507, 
513-15, 616, 656, 695, 738, 744) . The framer, contrary to Mr. 
Allen's testimony, testified that Allen was not involved in 
resolving framing problems. (R. 657, 704). 
The record reveals that at times Bailey-Allen was neglectful 
of its duties, if not incompetent. For example, in looking after 
the architectural plans, which was a responsibility of the general 
contractor (R. 4 91), it appears that Mr. Allen lost them. During 
an inspection, when Mr. Kent went to obtain the plans (which were 
supposed to remain on-site), he found they were missing. (R. 491, 
518) . 
The trial court's Amended Finding No. 17 is not supported by 
the evidence. It was Mr. Kurzet, Mr. Parker, and others who were 
on-site, not Bailey-Allen, were "generally coordinating" the work. 
Although there can be little doubt that Mr. Allen performed some 
services of a general contractor, they are insufficient as a matter 
of law to support the trial court's award of $10,000 to Bailey-
Allen. The trial court's Initial Finding from the bench at the 
close of trial more accurately reflects the record: 
Of course [Mr. Kurzet] said there were 
philosophical difference (sic), and I think 
there were differences that began to arise as 
far as the attitude of being on the job, 
taking care of things right now, getting 
things done, seeing that they were done, 
seeing things were moving along, answering the 
questions, which the plaintiffs were not 
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performing as far as the contract was 
concerned. 
Therefore the Court does find that the 
plaintiff did breach the contract, and that 
the defendant was justified in terminating the 
relationship, terminating the Contract. 
(R. 801). 
5. Finding of Fact No, 19 Is Not Supported By the 
Evidence, 
Amended Finding of Fact No. 19 states: 
The Court finds that Defendant Stanley Kurzet 
was regularly on the job site, often as much 
as six (6) hours a day. He personally 
observed the progress on the home. As a 
result, Defendants were aware of the progress 
of the home while Plaintiff was the general 
contractor and was aware of the benefit 
Defendants received as a result of Plaintiff's 
services. 
(R. 1117) (emphasis added). Kurzets do not dispute this finding 
except the last clause that states they were aware of a benefit 
received from Bailey-Allen's services. The finding implies, 
incorrectly, that because Mr. Kurzet was on the job site, he 
appreciated some benefit from Bailey-Allen's efforts. 
During the three months of Bailey-Allen's tenure, the 
structure progressed from a foundation slab and steel columns at 
the beginning of July to a structure with masonry chimneys and 
three floors framed by the first week in October. (R. 646-47, 
676-77) . It is true that because Mr. Kurzet was frequently on 
site, he would be likely to know whether Bailey-Allen contributed 
toward that progress. Mr. Kurzet's testimony was that Bailey-Allen 
was not there and the benefit was entirely conferred by others. 
(R.618-19). 
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Mr. Allen admitted that the main focus of the construction 
during that three-month period was the masonry and the framing. 
(R. 756) . Mr. Kurzet attributes the progress made during that time 
entirely to the framer, Andrew Parker, who acted as the general 
contractor. (R. 513, 618-19). Although Mr. Parker tried to keep 
Allen abreast of the progress, he was not there to contribute on a 
day-to-day basis. (Id.) Bailey-Allen was not on the job site long 
enough to perform the services it had been hired to perform. (R. 
616) . 
To the extent Amended Finding No. 19 suggests that the 
progress on the home was due to Bailey-Allen's efforts, it is 
inconsistent with the trial court's ruling at the close of trial 
and the Original Findings, and contrary to the evidence. 
6. Finding of Fact No, 20 Is Not Supported by the 
Evidence, 
Finding of Fact No. 20 states as follows: 
The Court finds that at no time during the 
three-month period in which the Contract was 
in effect did Defendant's express any 
dissatisfaction with the work or progress on 
the job. On at least one occasion Stanley 
Kurzet expressed to Plaintiff that he was 
satisfied with the way the work was going. 
Defendants did not attempt to stop Plaintiff 
from completing the Contract until Defendant, 
Stanley Kurzet, terminated the same in 
connection with the insurance matter. 
(R. 1117-18) (emphasis added). 
It is not true as the court found that "at no time during the 
three-month period . . . did Defendants express any dissatisfaction 
with the work or progress on the job." (R. 1117). Mr. Allen 
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admitted that Mr. Kurzet occasionally expressed dissatisfaction. 
(R. 348). Mr. Kent, likewise, testified as follows: 
Q. Did Mr. Kurzet ever express satisfaction generally with 
the way things were being handled prior to October 2nd? 
A. Not generally. 
Q. Did he ever express concerns about an item or two that 
maybe wasn't going the way he wanted it to? 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. Did Mr. Kurzet have a manner by which you could tell 
which things were important to him or not? 
A. Yes, he would tell you verbally, and if he were more 
concerned, he would give it in writing. 
(R. 466-67) . Mr. Kurzet also testified that he expressed his 
dissatisfaction through entries in his log book that were 
distributed to Bailey-Allen, and verbally. (R. 510-11) . The 
court's Finding that Mr. Kurzet never express dissatisfaction 
simply does not square with the record. 
7. Summary. 
In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support 
the trial court's Amended Findings, the evidence must be viewed in 
light most favorable to Bailey-Allen. Consolidation Coal Company 
v. Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, 886 P.2d 514 (Utah 
1994); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 
1989). Nevertheless, there is absolutely no evidence to support 
the findings that (1) "Allen of the Plaintiff visited the 
construction site practically every day for some period of time"; 
(2) Mr. Allen "made and received daily calls concerning the job," 
either from his home or on his mobile phone; and (3) that Kurzets 
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did not express dissatisfaction with the work during the three 
month period. Even viewing Kent and Allen's testimony in the most 
favorable light, the findings that (1) Kurzets realized a $10,000 
benefit from Bailey-Allen's general contracting services during 
that three month period; and (2) that Bailey-Allen performed 
significant general contracting services, are against the clear 
weight of evidence. 
The foregoing Amended Findings of Fact, therefore, should be 
set aside as clearly erroneous and the Amended Judgment reversed. 
C. The Trial Court's Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law Do Not Satisfy the Elements Necessary 
for Recovery in Quasi-Contract. 
The Court of Appeals carefully discussed the elements 
necessary for recovery on a claim for unjust enrichment. (R. 
811 (a)-812). The Court stated: 
To prove a contract implied in law or unjust 
enrichment, the following must be shown: " (1) 
The defendant received a benefit; (2) an 
appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of 
the benefit; (3) under circumstances that 
would make it unjust for the defendant to 
retain the benefit without paying for it." 
(R. 812) (quoting Davies v. Olsen, 746 P.2d at 269). 
On the first appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the first 
element under Davies had not been satisfied because the conclusion 
was internally inconsistent that Bailey-Allen conferred a benefit 
"regardless of whether Plaintiff performed its duties under the 
Contract." (R. 812). The Court of Appeals held that the trial 
court must find that the 10% of the work completed during Bailey-
Allen's contract was due to Bailey-Allen's performance on the job. 
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In its Amended Conclusions of Law, the Court stated: "The 
Court concludes that Plaintiff's services as general contractor 
conferred a benefit to the Defendants." (R. 1119) . The court also 
turned around the statement that 10% of the Project had been 
completed during the time plaintiff was general contractor and 
stated: 
The Court concludes that the proper and 
appropriate measure of the benefit conferred 
upon Defendants is the pro-rata portion of the 
fee previously agreed in the Contract. Based 
upon the testimony of Defendants' expert 
witness, one-tenth of construction 
contemplated by the Contract was completed and 
as a result, plaintiff conferred a benefit 
upon defendants in the amount of $10,000. 
(R. 1120) (emphasis added). As discussed above, the trial court's 
Amended Findings do not state that Bailey-Allen conferred any 
benefit. Assuming it did, there is not substantial evidence to 
support that proposition. (R. 1120) . The first element of the 
Davies test has not and cannot be met. 
Likewise, the second element of the Davies test has not been 
satisfied. The Amended Conclusions state: 
The Court concludes that the Defendants were 
aware of the benefit conferred as a result of 
Plaintiff's general contractor services 
through its actual on-site observation and 
satisfaction of the work performed. 
(R. 1120) . As discussed above, Kurzets do not acknowledge any 
benefit received from Bailey-Allen. They contend, and the evidence 
demonstrates that during the three-month period of the Contract, 
the progress toward completion was accomplished by the framer and 
the mason, not by Bailey-Allen or its subcontractors. The court's 
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conclusion that Kurzets were aware of the benefit, is simply not 
warranted by the facts. (R. 1119-20). Moreover, the Amended 
Finding that Kurzets did not express any satisfaction with Bailey-
Allen's performance is simply contrary to the evidence. 
The trial court's Amended Conclusions of Law state explicitly 
the third element of the Davies test: " [I]t would be unjust for the 
Defendants to retain the benefit received without paying for the 
same." (R. 1120). The conclusion is not supportable, however, in 
view of the absence of evidence in the record to support the 
Amended Findings of Fact and the absence of any explanation for the 
trial court's reversal of its Original Findings. For the foregoing 
reasons, Bailey-Allen has not satisfied the elements for recovery 
in quasi-contract. 
D. The Trial Court Erred in Determining that Kurzets Had 
Been Unjustly Enriched by Bailey-Allen's Renegotiating 
the Price Lumber and Erred in Determining the Amount by 
which thev were Supposedly Enriched. 
The Court of Appeals instructed the trial court to determine 
whether an award in quasi-contract was warranted for Bailey-Allen 
having saved Kurzets $5,500 on the purchase of lumber that had been 
ordered by a previous contractor. (R. 812(a)). The Court of 
Appeals stated: 
We note that the court should make certain 
that any benefit conferred in negotiating the 
price of the lumber must be somehow in 
addition to the benefits Bailey-Allen 
conferred by virtue of performing its 
contractual duty to supervise the project. 
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(Id.) (emphasis added). Bailey-Allen had a contractual duty to 
obtain competitive, economic bids for materials. (R.010). The 
Contract provides as follows: 
The Contractor will obtain competitive bids 
for services and materials . . . Every effort 
will be made by the Contractor to locate, 
solicit and select suppliers sufficiently in 
advance of need to prevent the forced 
acceptance of and uneconomic bid. All bids 
will provide sufficient detail to permit an 
intelligent analysis of the value of such bid. 
(R. 0010). On remand, the trial court, without citing any evidence 
or hearing any argument on the meaning of this provision, entered 
Amended Conclusion of Law No. 17 which states simply: "Negotiation 
of the disputed lumber bill left over from prior contractor was not 
within the scope of the Contract." (R. 1121). The court made no 
attempt to ascertain the intention of the parties or to interpret 
the relevant provision of the Contract that might have guided its 
decision. 
Bailey-Allen was required to obtain bids and see that Kurzet's 
paid a fair price for services and material. Bailey-Allen did not 
obtain the initial bid on the lumber because it had not yet been 
hired as general contractor. But it inventoried the lumber and 
compared the invoiced price against its estimation of the value. 
In terms of its duty to obtain competitive bids for materials, 
there seems to be little difference between obtaining a reasonable 
price when ordering materials and obtaining a reasonable price for 
materials delivered but not yet paid for. Moreover, Mr. Allen's 
own testimony suggests that he considered counting up lumber as 
part of his general contractor duties since he included that task 
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in his description of services that he supposedly provided as a 
general contractor. (R. 339-40) . In the absence of any other 
evidence of record or analysis by the trial court as to the meaning 
of the Contract, there is no basis for its conclusion that such 
duties fall outside the Contract. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that counting and 
negotiating the price of lumber were not within the scope of the 
Contract, the trial court's Amended Judgment on this issue still 
should be reversed because its calculation of damages is without 
any basis in the facts or the law. 
Damages for unjust enrichment are recoverable when it can be 
shown that defendant received a benefit, that defendant had a 
knowledge or appreciation of the benefit, when it would be unjust 
for defendant to retain the benefit without paying for it. (R. 
812); Davies v. Olsen, 646 P.2d at 269. The measure of damages is 
"[tlhe benefit conferred on the defendant, and not the plaintiff's 
detriment or the reasonable value of its services." (R. 812) 
(citing Davies 646 P. 2d at 269) (emphasis in original) . 
The relevant Amended Conclusion of Law states: 
The Court concludes that with respect to the 
inventorying and negotiation of a settlement 
on the disputed prior lumber bill, Plaintiff 
conferred a benefit on the Defendants in the 
amount of $5,500, which benefit is in addition 
to the benefit conferred by Plaintiff's 
completion of 10% of the construction. The 
Court concludes that Defendants were aware of 
Plaintiff's actions with respect thereto and 
that it would be unjust to allow Defendants to 
retain such benefit without payment of a 
reasonable fee to Plaintiff for such benefit. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that a fee of 1-2 
the savings on the lumber bill or $2,750, is 
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fair and reasonable under the circumstances. 
The Court finds this result particularly fair 
and reasonable inasmuch as the Court has 
deducted from Plaintiff's recovery the cost of 
extra materials Plaintiff ordered for the job 
which were ultimately found to be unnecessary. 
(R. 1121-22).7 The court's disposition of the issue ignores the 
Court of Appeals instruction that any damages awarded in unjust 
enrichment must be predicated on the value of the benefit rendered. 
The court somehow concluded that because Bailey-Allen saved Kurzets 
$5,500 on the negotiation of lumber, that Bailey-Allen should be 
entitled to half of the savings. That calculation is a compromise 
of the court's Original Judgment awarding Bailey-Allen the entire 
amount. (Clearly, if Bailey-Allen were awarded the entire $5,500, 
Kurzets would have realized no benefit at all.) The court decided, 
therefore, to split the savings in half. The award is an 
absolutely arbitrary determination of the value of the benefit 
conferred. 
Because there i s no bas is in the record for the court to 
conclude tha t counting lumber f e l l outside the Contract, and 
because the court has a r b i t r a r i l y ar r ived at the measure of 
damages, the award to Bailey-Allen of $2,750 for negot ia t ing the 
pr ice of lumber should be reversed. 
7
 The t r i a l cour t appa ren t ly misunderstood the Court of Appeals ' 
i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t in order t o support an award, i t must f ind " t h a t any b e n e f i t 
confer red in n e g o t i a t i n g the p r i c e of lumber must be somehow in a d d i t i o n t o the 
b e n e f i t s Ba i l ey -Al len confer red by v i r t u e of performing i t s c o n t r a c t u a l duty to 
supe rv i se the p r o j e c t " . (R. 8 1 2 ( a ) ) . I n s t ead , the cour t found t h a t such d u t i e s 
were in a d d i t i o n t o the 10% b e n e f i t supposedly confe r red . (R. 1121-22) . 
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E. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Kurzet's Motion for 
Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc. 
A judgment is final until it is reversed on appeal, 
modified or set aside by the court that rendered it. D'Aston v. 
Aston, 844 P. 2d 345, 351 (Utah App. 1992) . When an opportunity 
exists to challenge a decision at one stage of the litigation, and 
the decision remains unchallenged, it becomes "the law of the case 
for future stages of the same litigation and the parties are deemed 
to have waived the right to challenge that decision at a later 
time." Williamsburg Wax Museum Inc. v. Historic Figures, Inc., 810 
F.2d 243, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1987) . If a judgment is reversed on 
appeal, the reversal invalidates only the portion of the judgment 
to which the appellate court's decision extends "in actuality or by 
necessary implication." D'Aston v. Aston, 844 P. 2d at 351-52. 
Other portions of the judgment remain in effect. "Any portion of 
the judgment not appealed from continues in effect, regardless of 
the reversal of other parts of the judgment." Id. at 352 (quoting 
Calistro v. Spokane Valley Irr. Dist. No. 10, 78 Wash.2d 234, 472 
P.2d 539, 540 (1970)); see also, IB Moore's Federal Practice, § 
0.404. [4. (3)] (1993) ("If an appeal is taken from only part of the 
judgment, the remaining part is res judicata, and the vacation of 
the portion appealed from does not revive the trial court's 
jurisdiction of the unappealed portion of the judgment). 
On October 6, 1992, the Court entered the Original Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law concluding that Bailey-Allen was liable 
to Kurzets in the amount of $4,359 for faulty construction and for 
over-ordering materials. (R. 218-19). Judgment was entered 
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applying those amounts as offsets against the $15,500 award to 
Bailey-Allen for unjust enrichment leaving a net judgment in favor 
of Bailey-Allen of $11,141. (R. 220-22). 
Bailey-Allen did not challenge the portion of the Original 
Judgment in favor of Kurzets, either at the trial court, or on the 
first appeal. It did not move for reconsideration or to set aside 
the judgment, nor did it cross appeal to the Court of Appeals. 
Bailey-Allen never questioned the portion of the Original Judgment 
in favor of Kurzets until August of 1995 when, after remand, 
Kurzets moved for entry of judgment nunc pro tunc. (R. 0969-978). 
Likewise, the Court of Appeals' mandate did not affect the 
portion of the judgment in favor of Kurzets. The Court was very 
specific in identifying the issues that were remanded to the trial 
court for further consideration. It stated: 
Bailey-Allen was not entitled to recover damages under 
the Contract. However, it may be entitled to recover in 
quantum meruit. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for 
entry findings consistent with this opinion and, if those 
findings support an award in quantum meruit, for an entry 
of a judgment. We reverse the award of pre-judgment 
interest, and we direct the trial court to award post-
judgment interest, if a judgment is awarded, only from 
the date the new judgment on remand is entered. Finally, 
we reverse and remand for entry of attorney fees under 
the Mechanic's Lien Statute and for consideration of 
whether they should be awarded under the Bond Statutes. 
(R. 814(a)). The trial court was authorized to amend the Original 
Judgment only to the extent the Court of Appeals directed. It was 
not authorized to address the portion of the Original Judgment 
awarding offsets to Kurzets. The award to Kurzets, therefore, 
remains final and effective as of October 6, 1992, the date the 
Original Judgment was entered. Post-judgment interest should run 
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on the award from and after October 6, 1992. Mason v. Western 
Mortgage, 754 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1988).8 
This Court should direct that the trial court enter judgment 
in favor of Kurzets in the amount of $4,359.00 as of October 6, 
1992 with interest accruing at the legal rate from and after that 
date. 
F. The Tr ia l Court Erred in Fai l ing to Award Sanctions for 
Bai ley-Al len 's Violation of Rule 11. 
Rule 11 provides tha t when an a t torney signs a pleading, 
". . . to the best of h i s knowledge, 
information, and bel ief formed a f te r 
reasonable inquiry i t i s well grounded in fact 
and i s warranted by ex i s t ing law or a good 
f a i t h argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversa l of ex i s t ing 
law. . . 
(Utah R. Civ. P. 11) (1995) . "Reasonable inquiry" does not requi re 
the a t torney signing the pleading to reach the r igh t conclusion 
regarding the s t a t e of the law. I t does, however, require t h a t , 
a f t e r reasonable inquiry, the conclusion be at l eas t "p laus ib le . " 
Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d 917 (Utah 1993) . Bailey-
8
 In address ing post- judgment i n t e r e s t on the f i r s t appeal , the Court 
of Appeals s t a t e d : 
Mason d i c t a t e s t h a t any post- judgment i n t e r e s t awarded in t h i s case 
should run only from the da te of the new judgment on remand, ^d. a t 
987. We t h e r e f o r e r eve r se the award of post- judgment i n t e r e s t from 
Apr i l 17, 1992 and remand for the e n t r y of post- judgment i n t e r e s t , 
i f damages a r e awarded, only from the da te the new judgment i s 
e n t e r e d . 
(R. 8 1 3 ( a ) ) . The foregoing s ta tement of the Court of Appeals contemplates 
i n t e r e s t on a judgment on remand i f one i s en t e red in favor of Ba i l ey -Al l en . The 
p o r t i o n of the Or ig ina l Judgment in favor of Kurzets was never before the Court 
of Appeals . The Court of Appeals ' s ta tement , t h e r e f o r e , should not be taken t o 
mean t h a t i n t e r e s t on the o r i g i n a l award t o Kurzets begins t o run only i f and 
when a new judgment in favor of Ba i ley-Al len i s en t e red on remand. Utah law i s 
c l e a r t h a t i n t e r e s t runs from the da te t h a t judgment i s e n t e r e d . (Utah R. App. 
P .32; Mason, 754 P.2d a t 987). 
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Allen's motion to set aside the dismissal of the mechanic's lien 
cause of action was not even plausible. Minimal inquiry would have 
revealed that the trial court could not revisit the order 
dismissing the mechanic's lien cause of action. See Arnica Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 678 P.2d 950, 969-70 (Utah App. 1989) 
(after denial of first motion to set aside, remedy is direct 
appeal); Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 
1995) ("law of the case" precludes relitigating issues previously 
decided in the same case). 
When this case was in the trial court for the first time, on 
or about May 20, 1991, Kurzets filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment on the second, and fourth causes of action brought under 
the mechanic's lien statute and the construction bond statute (R. 
062) . The court granted those motions and dismissed the second and 
fourth cause of action. (R. 106) ,9 Bailey-Allen filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Order Dismissing the Mechanic's Lien Claim 
(R. 162), which the court denied on April 12, 1992 (R. 182). On 
October 6, 1992, the court adopted the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and entered the Original Judgment. (R. 214-222). 
On August 24, 1995, more than one year after the first appeal 
had been decided, Bailey-Allen, along with its Memorandum in 
Opposition to Kurzets' Motion for Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc, 
filed a Motion to Set Aside the Trial Court's Prior Order 
Dismissing the Mechanic's Lien Cause of Action. (R. 962-63). 
9
 At the same time, the court also dismissed the third cause of action for 
unjust enrichment, which it later reinstated during trial. 
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Bailey-Allen argued that the court's dismissal was error in the 
first instance and that the trial court should reverse that action 
and vacate Judge Iwasaki's award of attorney fees to Kurzets. (R. 
969, 973-76) . 
Kurzets responded to the Motion with a memorandum pointing out 
that because Bailey-Allen failed to take the issue on appeal, it 
had become res judicata. (R. 981, 992-94) . At the same time, 
Kurzets, believing Bailey-Allen's motion to be clearly unwarranted, 
filed a Motion for Sanctions under Rule 11. (R. 997) . Bailey-Allen 
withdrew the motion, but not before defendants had briefed it and 
filed its motion for sanctions. (R. 1008). 
Hearing on the Motion for Sanctions took place on November 21, 
1995. From the bench the court stated: 
. . .the defendant asked for sanctions. Well, 
this gets extremely difficult. I don't think 
that the plaintiff's motion - I agree with the 
defendant that the plaintiff's motion, when 
they did not appeal, that he had any cause to 
bring the motion back before the court, and 
that should have been appealed. There's no 
doubt in the court's mind on that. 
(R. 1060). Although the language is imprecise, the court's meaning 
is clear; the Motion to Reinstate the Mechanic's Lien Cause of 
Action was without any basis in the law or reasonable extension 
thereof. The trial court correctly decided from the bench that the 
motion to set aside was filed in violation of Rule 11. It should 
have entered a finding in that regard. The court, however, thought 
that Kurzets' counsel acted improperly in bringing the motion for 
Attorney Fees before Judge Iwasaki. (R. 1061). The court, 
therefore, instead of entering a finding that Rule 11 had been 
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violated and imposing appropriate sanctions, reached the following 
conclusion: 
But in a case of this type, and maybe to save 
attorney's fees, the attorney's would off-set 
each other on that. You could say - I guess 
what I'm saying is that this case has gone on 
too much as far as too much it seems like in 
personalities. I'm going to deny the motion 
for sanctions. I just don't think that 
they're necessary as far as the case is 
concerned. Any questions? 
(R. 1061) . (A copy of the transcript of the court's ruling from the 
bench is attached hereto as Addendum H). 
The court erred in refusing to enter a finding that there had 
been a violation of Rule 11, and in "offsetting" that violation 
against the perceived improper conduct of Kurzets' counsel in 
bringing the motion for attorney fees before Judge Iwasaki. 
The court also erred in failing to award attorney fees upon 
finding a violation of Rule 11. Rule 11 provides: 
If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed 
in violation of this rule, the court, upon 
motion or upon its own initiative, shall 
impose upon the person who signed it, a 
represented party, or both, and appropriate 
sanction. . . (Utah R. Civ. P.11) 
The rule gives the trial court substantial latitude to tailor the 
sanctions to fit the particular facts of each case. Taylor v. 
Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). It does not 
give the trial court discretion to decline to impose sanctions. 
This Court should direct the trial court to enter specific 
findings in conformity with its statements from the bench, and to 
impose appropriate sanctions under Rule 11. 
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XI, CONCLUSION 
The trial court failed to follow the mandate of the Court of 
Appeals to enter consistent, detailed findings on the elements of 
Bailey-Allen's claim against Kurzets for unjust enrichment. 
Consequently, the inconsistencies that led the Court of Appeals to 
reverse the Original Judgment have not been resolved. In addition, 
the Amended Findings identified above, upon which the Amended 
Judgment rests, are clearly erroneous. They are not supported by 
substantial and credible evidence in the record and, in some 
instances, are directly contrary to the evidence. As demonstrated 
in this Brief, the trial court's Amended Judgment manifests a clear 
abuse of discretion. 
In a case such as this one, where the trial court has failed 
to correct its errors on remand, the appellate court may take 
corrective action in the interests of justice. The Court of 
Appeals has stated: 
We are troubled by the incomplete resolution 
of the issues raised in our remand order. 
Parties to a. . . proceeding are rarely well-
served by repeated examination of the same 
issues. . . . To permit the dispute to 
continue is an injustice to the parties. 
Willev v. Willev, 914 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Utah App. 1996). Kurzets 
respectfully submit that it would be appropriate for this Court to 
direct the trial court to enter Kurzets' proposed Amended Findings 
and Conclusions and proposed Amended Judgment. 
Kurzets further request that this Court reverse the trial 
court's denial of Kurzets' motion for entry of judgment nunc pro 
tunc and direct the trial court to enter judgment as of that date 
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and to award Kurzets interest from and after that date. As 
discussed above, that judgment has remained undisturbed since the 
day it was entered on October 6, 1992. 
Finally, Kurzets respectfully request that this Court direct 
the trial court to enter the finding it made from the bench that 
Rule 11 was violated when Bailey-Allen filed their motion to set 
aside the dismissal of the mechanic's lien cause of action. There 
is no support anywhere in the law for the court's theory that a 
Rule 11 violation can be offset against some other perceived bad 
conduct. If nominal fees are appropriate, as the trial court 
suggested, they must be awarded. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should vacate the 
Amended Findings and Conclusions, reverse the Amended Judgment, and 
remand the case to the trial court to enter judgment in favor of 
Kurzets. 
DATED this 26th day of November/ 1996. 
Spencex E.yAustin 
Willi^miJ< Evans 
PARSOTTSTBEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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ADDENDUM A 
SPENCER E. AUSTIN (0150) 
WILLIAM J. EVANS (5276) 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC., ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiff, ) AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
STANLEY M. KURZET, an ) 
individual; STANLEY M. KURZET ) 
and ANNE L. KURZET, as Trustees ) 
for THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; ) 
THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; and ) Civil No. 10870 
John Does 1 through 10, ) 
Defendants. ) 
* * * * * * * * 
This action, having been tried to the Court, and the 
Court, having considered the evidence and the arguments of coun-
sel, and good cause appearing therefor, hereby makes the follow-
ing findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the parties intended to and 
did enter into a written contract wherein plaintiff agreed to act 
, , ui ;iLES" 
OCT 7 1992 
Clerk of Summit County 
B Y . . . (toputy Cleric d^ 
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as the general contractor and to oversee the construction of 
defendants1 residence in Park City, Utah. 
2. The Court finds that the contract between the par-
ties provided that plaintiff would complete construction on 
defendants1 residence within one year and, in return, defendant 
would pay plaintiff $100,000 consideration for plaintiff's ser-
vices in directing and supervising the construction, and $22.00 
per hour for plaintiff's own hands-on labor. 
3. The Court finds that plaintiff was aware that 
defendants had experienced problems with prior general contrac-
tors and had terminated two general contractors for unsatisfac-
tory performance. Plaintiff was also aware that Mr. Kurzet was a 
meticulous and demanding individual and would require exacting 
performance of the contract. 
4. The Court finds the parties intended and the con-
tract provided for plaintiff, within 10 days after entering into 
the contract, to provide defendants with evidence of adequate 
liability insurance covering its work pursuant to the contract. 
5. The Court finds that plaintiff represented to 
defendants that plaintiff had $1 million in liability insurance 
coverage in force at the time the parties entered into the con-
tract on July 3, 1990, that defendants wanted $4-5 million in 
coverage, and that plaintiff later discovered its policy was only 
-2-
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for $300,000 coverage and that it had been cancelled on October 
24, 1989. 
6. The Court finds that, in a memorandum of July 20, 
1990 from defendants to plaintiff, which was delivered to Michael 
Kent, defendants notified plaintiff that plaintiff had not yet 
provided the necessary certificate evidencing insurance coverage 
and that defendants required such evidence under the terms of the 
contract. 
7. The court find that defendants terminated plain-
tiff's services on October 2, 1990. 
8. The Court finds, that about 10% of the construc-
tion project was completed while plaintiff was general contractor 
and, based on that percentage, defendants received a benefit from 
plaintiff's pre-termination services in the amount of $10,000 
regardless of whether plaintiff performed its duties under the 
contract. 
9. The Court finds that defendants realized a benefit 
of $5,500 which represents the amount saved by defendants through 




CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that the subject contract was 
ambiguous and incomplete as drafted and that the Court has a 
responsibility to add to it and to look upon it as an oral con-
tract between the parties. 
2. The Court concludes that the contract can be 
interpreted as written. 
3. The Court concludes that given the amount of the 
subject contract and the cost of the construction, plaintiff had 
a duty to inquire into the adequacy of its insurance coverage for 
the project, but did not. 
4. The Court concludes that plaintiff's failure to 
promptly provide evidence of adequate liability insurance was a 
material breach of the contract. 
5. The Court concludes that defendants were justified 
in terminating plaintiff's services for plaintiff's breach of its 
obligation to promptly provide evidence of adequate liability 
insurance. 
6. The Court concludes that defendants were justified 
in terminating plaintiff's services because plaintiff spent very 
few hours on the job site and did not give the construction 
project the attention that it required under the contract and 
that plaintiff knew Mr. Kurzet would expect. 
-4-
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7. The Court concludes that defendants are not in 
breach of the contract in any way. 
8. With respect to plaintiff's Unjust Enrichment 
Claim, the Court has considered several alternative methods of 
calculating any award to plaintiff under such a theory. The 
Court concludes the most logical basis to be the percentage of 
defendants1 residence that was completed during the period plain-
tiff was on the job. 
9. The Court rejects plaintiff's proposal that it 
should receive 1/4 or $25,000, of the $100,000 consideration con-
templated under the contract because it spent three months on the 
job, or one quarter, of the one-year period for constructing the 
residence as contemplated under the contract. The Court finds 
that such a proposal is unreasonable and unsupported by the 
facts. 
10. The Court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to 
receive $15,500 from defendant in quantum meruit/unjust enrich-
ment, based on the contract between plaintiff and defendants, 
$10,000 representing 1/10 of the contract price of $100,000 for 
services in completing 1/10 of the construction, and $5,500 for 
services involving negotiations for the purchase of lumber. 
11. The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to 
defendant for the sum of $1,800 which represents defendants' 
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costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of defendants1 
east side retaining wall. 
12. The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to 
defendants in the amount of $2,000 which represents defendants1 
costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of defendants' 
west side concrete steps. 
13. The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to 
defendants in the amount of $559, which represents defendants' 
costs for plaintiff's ordering three unnecessary Glu-Lam beams. 
14. The Court concludes plaintiff is entitled to 
pre-judgment interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum, 
from November 1, 1990, the date defendants terminated plaintiff's 
services, to April 17, 1992, the date this Court granted plain-
tiffs' Motion to Compel Filing of Findings of Fact, and 
post-judgment interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per 
annum from and after April 17, 1992. 
DATED this & day of C&>£ - , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
HOMER WILKINSON £ ^ J ? pTiE"- " ' ^ i 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge : Q ; K--J ~ O ^ 
IUCE J . NELSON \fifiilrT&i^ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC. , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STANLEY M. KURZET, an 
individual; STANLEY M. KURZET 
and ANNE L. KURZET, as Trustees 
for THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; 
THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; and 
John Does 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 10870 
* * * * * * * * 
This action came on for trial before the Court, the 
Honorable Homer Wilkinson, District Judge, presiding, and the 
issues, having been duly tried to the Court, and the Court having 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That plaintiff recover from defendants in quantum 
meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the contract between plaintiff 
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and defendants, the amount of $11,141.00, with interest thereon 
at the legal rate provided by law in accordance with paragraph 4 
below, which represents $10,000 for services rendered in direct-
ing and supervising l/10th of the construction of defendants1 
residence, and $5,500 for plaintiff's services involving negotia-
tions for the purchase of lumber, adjusted by applying as an off-
set the following awards to defendants: 
a. The sum of $1,800 which represents defen-
dants1 costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of 
defendants' east side retaining wall; 
b. The sum of $2,000 which represents defen-
dants' costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of 
defendants' west side concrete steps; and 
c. The sum of $559 which represents defendants' 
costs caused by plaintiff's ordering three unnecessary materials; 
2. That defendants are not entitled to attorneys' 
fees and costs attributable to defendants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment; 
3. That plaintiff is awarded $542.40 as its costs of 
court itemized as follows : 
a. Filing fee, $75,00; 
b. Service of process fees, $32.25; 
c. Kurzet deposition; $311.15; 
-2-
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d. Bailey/Kent depositions, $99.00; and 
e. Expert witness fee, $25.00. 
4. That plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment inter-
est on $11,141.00 at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum for 
the period from November 1, 1990 to April 17, 1992, and 
post-judgment interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per 
annum from and after April 17, 1992; and 
5. That defendant's counterclaims are hereby dis-
missed with prejudice. 
day of . 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
3RUCE J. NELSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
/ -
HOMER WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
i¥/ summIT ^ 
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ADDENDUM C 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Bailey-Allen Company, Inc., 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
MAY 3 1 1994 
Stanley M. Kurzet, an 
individual; Stanley M. Kurzet 
and Anne L. Kurzet, as 
trustees for the Kurzet Family 
Trust; The Kurzet Family 
Trust; and John Does 1 through 
10, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 930178-CA 
F I L E D 
(May 31, 1994) 
Third District, Summit County 
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Attorneys: Spencer E. Austin and William J. Evans, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellants 
Bruce J. Nelson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Orme. 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
Stanley Kurzet, Anne Kurzet, and the Kurzet Family Trust 
appeal from a district court order awarding Bailey-Allen Company, 
Inc., damages, prejudgment interest, and postjudgment interest 
under a construction contract and denying the Kurzets' request 
for attorney fees on their successful summary judgment motion. 
We reverse and remand. 
FACTS 
In July 1990, Stanley Kurzet and Bailey-Allen Company, Inc. 
entered into a contract for the construction of the Kurzets/ 
home. The agreement, which Mr. Kurzet drafted, provides in 
relevant portion: 
Uao9 
This Agreement covers all of the 
understandings existing between BAILEY-ALLEN 
(Contractor) and STANLEY KURZET (Owner) for 
the construction of a residence on LOT #4 of 
the EVERGREEN development at DEER VALLEY, 
PARK CITY, UTAH. 
The Contractor is retained by Owner on a 
cost plus fixed fee basis. Costs shall be 
billed monthly and payment shall be made 
within ten days of receipt of billing. The 
fee fixed for this contract is set at 
$100,000 for the residence as depicted in the 
drawings plus a maximum of $50,000 in 
directed additional work, if any. Any 
directed additional work in excess of an 
aggregate cost of $50,000 will result in 
additional fees based on 7% of the cost of 
such additional work. 
Both Contractor and Owner stipulate that 
this contract cannot be changed except and 
unless in writing, bearing the date and 
signatures of both parties. 
The Owner's review authority 
notwithstanding, the Contractor is fully 
responsible to Owner for the performance of 
subcontractors. Accordingly, costs 
occasioned by the failure of a subcontractor 
to perform shall not be assessable to Owner. 
The Contractor shall carry insurance 
specifically providing for saving Owner 
harmless from any action arising due to the 
injury of a worker even if an employ[ee] of a 
subcontractor or supplier who is not properly 
or adequately insured. Contractor shall, 
within 10 days of the date of this agreement 
furnish a Certificate of Insurance prepared 
by the Carrier or its Authorized Agent. The 
Certificate shall specifically state the 
purpose and limits of the policy and these 
shall show that the work to be performed 
under this contract is covered. 
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Contractor takes note that Owner is 
concerned about the quality of workmanship 
and materials and that this concern stems 
from prior experience with a local contractor 
and ownership of several condominiums at the 
Pinnacle development. Owner will not make 
unreasonable demands, however, slovenly 
workmanship and/or substandard materials will 
neither be accepted [n]or paid for by Owner. 
Owner considers that the fees he pays to 
Contractor are specifically for his expertise 
in selecting and supervising workers so as to 
avoid unacceptable and substandard 
workmanship and/or the use of substandard 
quality materials. 
The agreement is silent regarding remedies in the event of a 
breach by either party. 
Ten days after the contract was signed, Mr. Kurzet requested 
the required certificate of insurance, but never received it. 
Bailey-Allen later admitted that its policy had expired nearly 
two years earlier. In October 1990, Mr. Kurzet terminated 
Bailey-Allen's services, based on its failure to provide proof of 
insurance and Mr. Kurzet's dissatisfaction with Bailey-Allen's 
attention to the project. At the time of the termination, the 
work under the contract was approximately 10% complete, with the 
house framed and the roof partially finished. 
Bailey-Allen filed a complaint against the Kurzets in 
December 1990, alleging breach of contract, mechanics' lien, 
unjust enrichment, and failure to obtain a construction bond. 
The trial court subsequently granted the Kurzets' motion for 
partial summary judgment on the latter three causes of action, 
reserving the breach of contract cTaim for trial to the bench. 
At the trial on the breach of contract claim, the court 
reinstated sua sponte the unjust enrichment claim and granted a 
continuance for the parties to present their evidence thereupon. 
After hearing the evidence, the court determined "that the 
subject contract was ambiguous and incomplete as drafted and that 
the Court has a responsibility to add to it." The court further 
concluded that Bailey-Allen's failure to provide evidence of 
insurance and its lack of supervision of the project were 
material breaches of the contract that justified the termination. 
The court determined the Kurzets had not breached the contract. 
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The trial court then concluded that Bailey-Allen was 
entitled to recover under its unjust enrichment theory and went 
on to consider the amount of damages due, concluding that "the 
most logical basis [was] the percentage of defendants/ residence 
that was completed during the period plaintiff was on the job." 
Accordingly, the court awarded Bailey-Allen $15,500 "in quantum 
meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the contract between plaintiff 
and defendants, $10,000 representing 1/10 of the contract price 
for services in completing 1/10 of the construction, and $5,500 
for services involving negotiations for the purchase of lumber." 
Bailey-Allen was held liable to the Kurzets for $1800 in costs 
for repairing Bailey-Allen's faulty construction of a retaining 
wall, for $2000 for repairing its faulty construction of concrete 
steps, and for $559 in costs for unnecessary materials. 
The court entered judgment for Bailey-Allen in the amount of 
$11,141, representing its damages offset by the amounts owed to 
the Kurzets. The court awarded Bailey-Allen prejudgment interest 
and postjudgment interest from and after April 17, 1992, the date 
the trial court granted Bailey-Allen's motion to compel findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. The court dismissed the Kurzets' 
counterclaims and denied their claim for attorney fees and costs 
associated with their successful motion for partial summary 
judgment on the mechanics' lien and construction bond claims. 
The Kurzets appeal, claiming the trial court erred in: (1) 
awarding Bailey-Allen damages under the contract or in quantum 
meruit; (2) awarding prejudgment interest; (3) awarding 
postjudgment interest from the date it granted Bailey-Allen's 
motion to compel findings of facts and conclusions of law, rather 
than from the date the judgment was entered; and (4) denying 
their claim for attorney fees and costs on their successful 
partial summary judgment motion under the mechanics' lien and 
construction bond statutes. 
I. DAMAGE AWARD 
The trial court awarded Bailey-Allen $15,500 in damages "in 
quantum meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the contract between 
the parties."1 Whether the court's theory of recovery was proper 
raises a question of law, which this court reviews for 
correctness. Van Dvke v. Chappell, 818 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 
1. Bailey-Allen argues that the award of $10,000 was "clearly 
awarded pursuant to the construction contract [and not] under an 
^unjust enrichment' theory." However, the basis of the award is 
not as clear as Bailey-Allen suggests, particularly in light of 
the wording of the judgment. 
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1991) . We are also mindful that we may affirm a trial courts 
decision on any proper ground. Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte 
Vista Ranch, Inc.. 758 P.2d 451, 456 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 
769 P.2d 819 (Utah 1988); accord Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc.. 
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). Therefore, we can affirm the 
award if we find any proper basis to support it. 
A. Recovery Under the Contract 
We first look at the written contract to determine whether 
its terms justify the damage award. In evaluating the contract, 
this court must first ascertain whether the contract was 
integrated and second whether it was ambiguous. Ron Case Roofing 
& Asphalt Paving. Inc. v. Blomguist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 
1989) . Neither party argued that the contract was not 
integrated, and it expressly states that it was the entire 
understanding of the parties and could not be changed except in 
writing. Regarding ambiguity, however, the contract provided no 
guidance relevant to the proper remedy for breach. As such, the 
contract was ambiguous or, more accurately, silent as to the 
intent of the parties regarding remedies in case of breach. 
Furthermore, no extrinsic evidence shed light on what remedies 
the parties intended in the event of a breach. 
In the absence of any express contract provision or 
extrinsic evidence of intent, we look to a rule set forth in an 
early supreme court case for guidance in our analysis: "In an 
action upon the contract [the contractor] cannot recover unless 
and until he [or she] shows that he [or she] has, substantially 
at least, complied with its provisions." Ryan v. Curlew 
Irrigation & Reservoir Co., 36 Utah 382, 391, 104 P^  218, 221 
(1909) (emphasis added); see also Reliance Ins. v. Utah Dept. of 
Transp.. 858 P.2d 1363, 1370 (Utah 1991) (discussing doctrine of 
substantial completion, but holding it inapplicable on facts of 
case). Professor Corbin states this rule as follows: "[W]hen a 
contract has been made for an agreed exchange of two 
performances, one of which is to be-rendered first, the rendition 
of this one substantially in full is a constructive condition 
precedent to the duty of the other party to render his [or her] 
part of the exchange." 3A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 
§ 700, at 309 (1960). 
However, "[i]f the defective performance, though less than 
* substantial' has conferred benefits on the defendant in excess 
of his [or her] injury, he [or she] may be under a quasi-
contractual duty to pay that excess." Id. § 700, at 310. Thus, 
[a] contractor whose breach is such that he 
[or she] has rendered less than "substantial 
performance" has no right to the contract 
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price; he [or she] is said to have no remedy 
"on the contract" . . . . The contractor's 
right is a right to reasonable compensation 
for value received by the defendant over and 
above the injury suffered by the contractor's 
breach. 
Id. § 710, at 342. 
Applying this principle, we conclude neither the court's 
findings nor the underlying evidence establish that Bailey-Allen 
substantially performed under the contract. The court found only 
that what work was accomplished had come about regardless of 
whether Bailev-Allen performed. Furthermore, the court 
acknowledged that Bailey-Allen was "not performing" certain 
aspects of the contract, in addition to failing to obtain 
insurance. Even if we attribute to Bailey-Allen the 10% of the 
work completed during its three-month tenure, it still does not 
constitute substantial performance. Because Bailey-Allen failed 
to substantially perform as required by the contract, it cannot 
recover under the contract. 
B. Recovery in Quantum Meruit 
The Kurzets argue that the existence of a written contract 
bars an action in quantum meruit. They are correct that recovery 
in quantum meruit typically presupposes that no enforceable 
written or oral contract exists. Karaoanos v. Boardwalk Fries, 
Inc., 837 P.2d 576, 578 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 
(Utah 1992); accord Davies v. Olson. 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah App. 
1987). However, as explained above, there is no enforceable 
contract between Bailey-Allen and the Kurzets. Thus, recovery 
under quantum meruit may be appropriate. 
As discussed earlier, a non-breaching party is discharged 
from its contract duties but may h§ye a quasi-contractual duty to 
pay the value of the benefit conferred in excess of the damage 
caused by the contractor's breach. Corbin §§ 700, at 309-10, 
707, at 329. The Utah Supreme Court employed an analogous 
approach in Lowe v. Rosenlof, 12 Utah 2d 190, 364 P.2d 418 
(1961) , suggesting that recovery in quantum meruit is appropriate 
to compensate a breaching contractor for pre-breach work 
performed. The court stated that while a breaching contractor 
"is not entitled to the benefits of the contract, he [or she] is, 
nevertheless, entitled to payment on a quantum meruit basis for 
the work which he [or she] did perform." Id., 12 Utah 2d at 194-
95, 364 P.2d at 421; see also Backus v. Apishapa Land & Cattle 
Co., 615 P.2d 42, 44 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980); Eckes v. Luce, 173 P. 
219, 220 (Okla. 1918). 
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Quantum meruit has two branches, both rooted in justice. 
Davies. 746 P.2d at 269; accord Scheller v. Dixie Six Corp.. 753 
P.2d 971, 975 (Utah App. 1988). The branch applicable to this 
case is a contract implied in law, also known as quasi-contract 
or unjust enrichment, which is a legal action in restitution. 
Davies, 746 P.2d at 269. To prove a contract implied in law or 
unjust enrichment, the following must be shown: "(1) the 
defendant received a benefit; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by 
the defendant of the benefit; (3) under circumstances that would 
make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without 
paying for it." Id.; accord Backus. 615 P.2d at 44. The benefit 
conferred on the defendant, and not the plaintiff's detriment or 
the reasonable value of its services, is the measure of recovery. 
Davies, 746 P.2d at 269; accord Scheller, 753 P.2d at 975. 
The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law do 
not specifically address the three requirements for recovery 
under unjust enrichment, nor do the undisputed underlying facts 
make clear that a quasi-contract award is appropriate. Instead 
the court's findings are internally inconsistent. For example, 
the trial court concluded that Bailey-Allen conferred a $10,000 
benefit "regardless of whether plaintiff performed its duties 
under the contract." The Kurzets argue persuasively that Bailey-
Allen does not satisfy the first element of the Davies test 
because Bailey-Allen conferred no benefit upon them. The trial 
court seemed to agree, at least in theory, in finding that the 
10% of the work completed during Bailey-Allen's tenure was not 
necessarily due to its presence or performance. 
It is equally unclear whether the second element of the 
Davies test was satisfied. Mr. Kurzet's testimony suggests he 
failed to realize any benefit conferred directly by Bailey-Allen. 
In fact, the core of the Kurzets' defense is that Bailey-Allen 
failed to perform any of the material terms of the contract and 
that any portion of the project completed was accomplished by 
other parties. Furthermore, the trial court found that Bailey-
Allen did not give the project th^attention Mr. Kurzet demanded. 
Finally, under the third element, the trial court did not find 
explicitly that it would be unjust to allow the Kurzets to 
retain, without payment, the construction completed before 
Bailey-Allen was terminated. 
We are simply unable to determine whether the trial court's 
award of $10,000 "in quantum meruit/unjust enrichment" was 
predicated on the proper legal standard. We therefore reverse 
the award and remand for analysis and findings under the standard 
articulated in Davies. The trial court should make detailed, 
consistent findings on each of the three required elements and 
allow recovery only if all three are satisfied. 
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C. Measure of Damages 
If the trial court determines on remand that an award is 
warranted, we offer the following guidance for assessing the 
measure of damages. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
suggests a measure of damages referred to as "restitution in 
favor of party in breach." Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 374 (1981). Section 374 states that the breaching party is 
liable for the loss caused by the breach, but may recover the 
benefit conferred if it exceeds that loss. Id. The party 
seeking restitution must prove the measure of that benefit. Id. 
Therefore, if on remand the trial court determines that 
recovery under quantum meruit is appropriate, it must make 
findings on the damages caused by Bailey-Allen's breach. The 
court should also make particularized findings on any benefit 
conferred on the Kurzets by Bailey-Allen, including its 
supervision as the general contractor and its involvement in 
negotiating the purchase price of the lumber at issue. We note 
that the court should make certain that any benefit conferred in 
negotiating the price of the lumber must be somehow in addition 
to the benefits Bailey-Allen conferred by virtue of performing 
its contractual duty to supervise the project. Bailey-Allen 
should ultimately recover only the benefit conferred in excess of 
the damage it caused. We also note that the percentage of the 
work completed, if it resulted from Bailey-Allen's efforts, is 
not an unreasonable measure of the benefit conferred. See 
Darrell J. Didericksen & Sons, Inc. v. Magna Water & Sewer, 613 
P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1980) (noting trial court may determine 
recovery "on the basis of the contract price, or on.the 
reasonable value, of the portion of the project already completed 
and not paid for"); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
374 (1981) (deeming contract price inconclusive evidence of 
benefit conferred and stating "in no case will the party in 
breach be allowed to recover more than a ratable portion of the 
total contract price where such a portion can be determined"). 
II. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
The Kurzets next claim that the trial court improperly 
awarded Bailey-Allen prejudgment interest. Because we vacate the 
judgment, we deal with this issue only for the benefit of the 
trial court if it concludes on remand that a judgment under 
quantum meruit is proper. 
A trial court's decision on "entitlement to prejudgment 
interest presents a question of law which we review for 
correctness." Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.. 848 P.2d 
171, 177 (Utah App. 1993). The Utah Supreme Court recently 
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reiterated the rule that prejudgment interest is properly awarded 
when "the loss had been fixed as of a definite time and the 
amount of the loss can be calculated with mathematical accuracy 
in accordance with well-established rules of damages." Bellon v. 
Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991). The court also noted 
^v^t prejudgment interest is typically not allowed in cases of 
equitable relief that '"address themselves to the conscience and 
discretion of the trial court.,fl Id. (quoting Fullmer v. Blood. 
546 P.za 606f 610 (Utah 1976)). 
This c^urt has previously rejected a claim for prejudgment 
interest on an unjust enrichment award. Shoreline Dev.. Inc. v. 
Utah County. 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App. 1992). We noted that 
"the lack of mathematical certainty generally prevents an award 
of prejudgment interest in equity claims." Id. We conclude that 
any damages in this case cannot be fixed at a particular time and 
with accuracy. Smith v, Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, 1225 
(Utah App. 1990). Therefore, even if recovery in quantum meruit 
is awarded on remand, no prejudgment interest should be awarded. 
III. POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST2 
The Kurzets also appeal the award of postjudgment interest 
at 12% per annum from and after April 17, 1992, the date upon 
which the trial court granted Bailey-Allen's motion to compel 
findings, conclusions, and judgment.3 They claim that 
postjudgment interest, if appropriate at all, should accrue only 
as of the date a judgment is entered. We review the award of 
postjudgment interest, a question of law, under the .correction of 
error standard. £f. Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.. 848 
P.2d 171, 177 (Utah App. 1993) (applying same standard of review 
to prejudgment interest). 
2. If the trial court does not award damages on remand, then 
there will be no basis for post-judgment interest. We therefore 
offer the following guidance only in the event that damages are 
awarded. 
3. Apparently the delay in filing the findings, conclusions, and 
judgment occurred because the Kurzets obtained new counsel. As 
soon as the substitution of counsel took place, the documents 
were filed. Bailey-Allen argues that it was appropriate for the 
trial court to "penalize" the Kurzets for this delay. The 
Kurzets counter that Bailey-Allen could have sought sanctions for 
the delay and that the trial court should not have penalized them 
in this fashion for delaying the entry of the judgment. 
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Our decision in Mason v. Western Mortgage, 754 P.2d 984 
(Utah App. 1988), disposes of this issue. In Mason, this court 
held that postjudgment interest dates from the entry of a new 
judgment upon remand. Id. at 987. Moreover, we cited with 
approval a California case holding that •• *[a] judgment bears 
legal interest from the date of its entry in the trial couri»/ff 
Id. at 986 (quoting Stockton Theatres. Inc. v. Palermo, -?crO p.2d 
76, 78 (Cal. 1961)). 
Mason dictates that any postjudgment interest awarded in 
this case should run only from the date of the new judgment on 
remand. Id. at 987. We therefore reverse th* *ward of 
postjudgment interest from April 17, 1992 and remand for the 
entry of postjudgment interest, if damages are awarded, only from 
the date the new judgment is entered.4 
IV. ATTORNEY FEES 
Finally, the Kurzets challenge the trial courts denial of 
their request for attorney fees and costs attributable to their 
successful motion for partial summary judgment. On September 24, 
1991, the trial court granted the Kurzets' motion for partial 
summary judgment on the mechanics' lien and construction bond 
causes of action. At that time, the court "reserved for future 
determination" the request for attorney fees and costs. Although 
the Kurzets subsequently filed an Affidavit of Attorney Fees and 
Costs and requested such fees on several occasions, the trial 
court never determined the amount of fees and ultimately denied 
without explanation the request for attorney fees and costs 
attributable to the successful motion for partial summary 
judgment. 
In most cases, attorney fees are appropriately awarded only 
if authorized by statute or contract. Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1358). The Mechanics' Lien 
statute provides: "In any action brought to enforce any lien 
4. To avoid confusion on remand, we wish to make clear that any 
post-judgment interest should run from the date that the new 
judgment is entered, rather than orally rendered. See Utah R. 
App. P. 32; Mason, 754 P.2d at 987; see also National Steel 
Const, Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.. 543 P.2d 642, 644-45 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (concluding entry of judgment and not oral 
ruling liquidates damages because oral ruling subject to change 
before entry); Pure Gas & Chem. Co. v. Cook. 526 P.2d 986, 993 
(Wyo. 1974) (concluding verdict is not final liquidation of sum 
due until judgment entered and awarding post-judgment interest 
from date of entry). 
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under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to 
recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, 
which shall be taxed as costs in the action." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-1-18 (1988) (emphasis added). Bailey-Allen concedes that 
section 38-1-18 applies and apparently does not dispute that this 
is an action "to enforce any lien." Id. The issue, then, is 
whether attorney fees must be awarded under the statutory scheme. 
In Rotta v. Hawk. 756 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1988), this court 
observed that a lien foreclosure action satisfied the 
requirements of section 38-1-18. Id. at 716. Furthermore, the 
supreme court has previously ruled that the benefit of attorney 
fees under the statute is conferred upon "the successful party," 
which may include the party who defended against the lien. 
Palombi v. D & C Builders. 22 Utah 2d 297, 300-01, 452 P.2d 325, 
327-28 (1969). Therefore the Kurzets, as the successful party, 
were entitled to attorney fees. 
We thus conclude that the trial court erred in denying the 
Kurzets' request for attorney fees under the Mechanics' Lien 
statute, and we remand for a determination of the amount of 
reasonable attorney fees. For guidance in calculating that 
amount, we direct the trial court to Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d 
at 989-90 (establishing "practical guidelines" for evaluating 
evidence of reasonable attorney fees). 
Attorney fees under the Bond Statute may also be warranted. 
The Bond Statute states: "In an action for failure to obtain a 
bond, the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the 
prevailing party." Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(3) (1992) (emphasis 
added). Bailey-Allen is apparently correct, then, that section 
14-2-2(3) endows the trial court with discretion in awarding 
attorney fees. We must therefore determine whether the trial 
court's denial of those fees constituted an abuse of discretion. 
Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993) (awarding 
attorney fees under contract) . Hoover, in order for this court 
to conduct a meaningful review of that determination, we must 
rely on adequate findings of fact, Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 
143, 155-56 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 
1993), which are absent in this case. 
Consequently, the trial court's failure to set forth its 
basis for denying the requested attorney fees was an abuse of 
discretion, and we remand for the entry of findings supporting 
the decision to award or deny attorney fees under the Bond 
statute. When determining whether attorney fees should be 
awarded under the Bond Statute, the trial court should consider 
precedent treating the Bond Statute as auxiliary to the 
Mechanics' Lien Statute and as sharing with it a common purpose. 
See King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 13 Utah 2d 339, 341, 
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374 P.2d 254, 255-56 (1962); Rio Grande Lumber v. Darke, 50 Utah 
114, 124, 167 P. 241, 245 (1917). Those cases suggest that it is 
generally appropriate to award reasonable attorney fees under the 
Bond Statute when fees are awarded under the Mechanics' Lien 
Statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Bailey-Allen was not entitled to recover damages under the 
contract. However, it may be entitled to recover in quantum 
meruit. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the entry of 
findings consistent with this opinion and, if those findings 
support an award in quantum meruit, for the entry of a judgment. 
We reverse the award of prejudgment interest, and we direct the 
trial court to award postjudgment interest, if a judgment is 
awarded, only from the date the new judgment on remand is 
entered. Finally, we reverse and remand for the entry of 
attorney fees under the Mechanics' Lien Statute and for 
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This matter was tried to the Court on December 18 and 19, 1991 and January 30, 
1992. Having considered the evidence, testimony and exhibits produced at trial and the 
arguments of counsel, this Court previously entered its original Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment on October 6, 1992. Defendants subsequently appealed the Court's 
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment. 
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On May 24, 1994, the Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision reversing this 
Court's prior decision and remanding the matter to this Court for additional consideration. 
Subsequently on January 23, 1995, Judge Glenn Iwasaki of this Court entered 
Judgment in favor of Defendants in the amount of $1,937.50 for attorneys fees in connection 
with previously dismissed mechanic's lien and bonding statute causes of action. 
Pursuant to motion of the Plaintiff that this Court enter Amended Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Amended Judgment pursuant to the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, this Court has carefully reviewed the pleadings and documents on file herein, 
including the transcript of proceedings at trial. The Court has further reconsidered its original 
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment pursuant to the direction of the Utah Court of Appeals 
decision dated May 24, 1994. 
Further, on November 21, 1995, this Court also heard and considered oral argument by 
counsel for the parties on the issues relating to Plaintiffs motion to reconsider the matter. 
The Court acknowledges that through mis-communication between itself and counsel for the 
parties, the original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were inadequate and the Court 
desires to clarify its findings, conclusions and decision based upon the evidence. As a result, 
the following Amended Findings of Fact and Amended Conclusions of Law supcracye the 
original Findings and Conclusions entered by the Court prior to Defendants' appeal. 
Accordingly, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
2 
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AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the parties intended to and did enter into a written contract 
("Contract") wherein Plaintiff agreed to act as the general contractor and to oversee 
construction of Defendants' residence in Park City, Utah. The Contract called for a 
construction period of one year. 
2. The Court finds that Defendant Stanley M. Kurzet drafted the written Contract. 
3. The Court finds that the Contract between the parties provided that Plaintiff 
would complete construction on Defendants' residence within one year and, in return, 
Defendants would pay Plaintiff $100,000 consideration for Plaintiffs general contractor 
services in directing and supervising the construction, and $22.00 per hour for Plaintiffs own 
hands on labor. 
4. The Court finds that the Defendants had experienced problems with prior 
contractors on the residence and that Plaintiff was aware that Defendants had already 
terminated two earlier general contractors for unsatisfactory performance. Plaintiff was also 
aware that Stanley M. Kurzet was a meticulous ancFdemanding individual and would require 
exacting performance of the Contract. 
5. The Court finds that Plaintiff thereafter commenced performing its duties under 
the Contract. Plaintiff performed some direct hands on labor to the project and was paid for 
such work by Defendants. Plaintiff also performed services related to the services of a 
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general contractor. Plaintiff has received no compensation for such general contractor 
services. 
6. The Court finds that the parties also intended, and the Contract provided, for 
Plaintiff to provide Defendants with evidence of adequate liability insurance covering its work 
pursuant to the Contract. Such evidence of insurance was to have been provided by Plaintiff 
within ten (10) days of execution of the Contract. 
7. The Court finds that Plaintiff represented to Defendants that Plaintiff had one 
million dollars in liability insurance coverage in force at the time the parties entered into the 
contract on July 3, 1990, that Defendants wanted such insurance increased to four or five 
million in coverage, and that Plaintiff later discovered its policy was only for three hundred 
thousand dollars and that it had been cancelled on October 24, 1989. 
8. The Court finds that, in a memorandum of July 20, 1990 from Defendants to 
Plaintiff which was delivered to Michael Kent, Defendants notified Plaintiff that it had not yet 
provided the necessary certificate evidencing insurance coverage and that Defendants required 
such evidence under the terms of the Contract. 
9. The Court finds that Plaintiff did not subsequently provide the required 
certificate of insurance to the Defendants. 
10. The Court finds that Plaintiff did not give the construction project the attention 
that Plaintiff knew Mr. Kurzet would expect or demand. 
4 
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11. The Court finds that some construction mistakes occurred during the course of 
construction, causing Defendants subsequent damage for repairs, etc. in the total amount of 
$4,359.00 and detailed as follows: 
a. the sum of $1,800 in connection with the construction of Defendants' 
east side retaining wall; 
b. the sum of $2,000 in connection with the construction of Defendants' 
west side concrete steps; and 
c. the sum of $559 in materials ordered for the job by Plaintiff but which 
were subsequently deemed to be unnecessary. 
12. The Court finds that Defendants terminated Plaintiffs services on October 2, 
1990, after three months of work on the construction project by Plaintiff; 
13. The Court finds that there is no provision in the Contract relating to the 
measure of damages in the event of default thereof by either party. 
14. The Court finds that during the three month period that the Contract was in 
effect, Michael Kent of the Plaintiff was on the construction site approximately thirty (30) 
hours per week. In addition, Mr. Richard Allen of the Plaintiff visited the construction site, 
practically every day for some period of time^ x>\x V\\s ov t^v. Ve.s\?imo»svx . y(* 
15. The Court finds that Mr. Allen was also available on his mobile phone when 
not on site and made or received daily calls concerning the job. 
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16. The Court finds that Mr. Allen also spent considerable time at his home in the 
evening making calls, setting up appointments and contacting other contractors in connection 
with the job. 
17. The Court finds that during the three month period that the Contract was in 
effect, Plaintiff performed general contractor services, including the hiring of subcontractors, 
overseeing the work of subcontractors, getting bids on retaining walls, windows, cabinets and 
other items, meeting with people, including building inspectors, and generally coordinating the 
work on the job. 
18. The Court finds that during the time Plaintiff was the general contractor of the 
project, the residence progressed from a concrete slab to a point where the roof was ready to 
be completed on the multi-story residence. Based upon the testimony of Defendants' expert 
witness, the Court finds that 10% of the construction project contemplated by the Contract 
was completed during the time Plaintiff was general contractor. 
19. The Court finds that Defendant Stanley Kurzet was regularly on the job site, 
often as much as six (6) hours a day. He personally-observed the progress on the home. As 
a result, Defendants were aware of the progress of the home while Plaintiff was the general 
contractor and was aware of the benefit Defendants received as a result of Plaintiffs services. 
20. The Court finds that at no time during the three month period in which the 
Contract was in effect did Defendants express any dissatisfaction with the work or progress on 
the job. On at least one occasion Stanley Kurzet expressed to Plaintiff that he was satisfied 
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with the way the work was going. Defendants did not attempt to stop Plaintiff from 
completing the Contract until Defendant Stanley Kurzet terminated the same in connection the 
insurance matter. 
21. The Court finds that Defendant Kurzet acknowledged at trial that Plaintiff was 
the general contractor on the job during the time in which the work was completed which was 
the subject of Plaintiff s Complaint. 
22. The Court finds that after commencing its duties under the Contract, Plaintiff 
also inventoried and hand counted all lumber at the site which had been ordered by a prior 
contractor. Plaintiff thereafter engaged in successful negotiations and settlement of a dispute 
with the vendor of such lumber over the amount owing thereon. 
23. The Court finds that Defendants received a benefit of $5,500 through Plaintiffs 
settlement of the dispute over the amount owed on the prior lumber order. Defendants were 
aware of Plaintiff s involvement in such matter and were aware of the $5,500 savings which 
they thereby received. 
From the foregoing Amended Findings of-Faet, the Court now makes and enters the 
following: 
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that the parties entered into a valid and binding Contract 
on July 3, 1990 for the construction of Defendants' residence in Park City, Utah. Under the 
terms thereof, Plaintiff was obligated to perform certain services and duties as general 
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contractor of the construction and Defendants were similarly obligated to pay Plaintiff for 
services rendered under the Contract. 
2. The Court concludes that given that amount of the Contract and the cost of the 
construction, Plaintiff had a duty to inquire into the adequacy of its insurance coverage for the 
project, but did not do so. 
3. The Court concludes that Defendants were justified in terminating Plaintiffs 
services under the Contract as a result of Plaintiffs breach of its obligation to promptly 
provide evidence of adequate liability insurance. 
4. The Court concludes that Defendants were not in breach of the Contract in any 
way at the time Plaintiff was terminated as general contractor for the project. 
5. The Court finds that prior to Plaintiffs termination as general contractor, it had 
not substantially completed their duties under the Contract. As a result, Plaintiff is not 
entitled to recover under the Contract. 
6. The Court concludes that the parties intended under the Contract that Plaintiff 
would be responsible for the actions of subcontracted on the job and responsible to 
Defendants for any mistakes made by such subcontractors. Conversely, the Court concludes 
that the parties also intended that Plaintiff should also be attributed with the benefits of any 
cumulative work done by subcontractors on the project. 
7. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs services as general contractor conferred a 
benefit to the Defendants. 
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8. The Court concludes that the Defendants were aware of the benefit conferred as 
a result of Plaintiffs general contractor services through its actual on-site observation and 
satisfaction of the work performed. 
9. The Court concludes that under the circumstances, it would be unjust for the 
Defendants to retain the benefit received without payment for the same. 
10. The Court concludes that on the basis of contract implied in law, quasi-contract 
or unjust enrichment, Plaintiff is entitled to recover from the Defendants the value of the 
benefit conferred upon Defendants, less any damages resulting from Plaintiffs breach of the 
Contract. 
11. The Court rejects Plaintiffs argument that it had earned and should receive 
one-fourth, or $25,000, of the $100,000 fee because it had spent three months on the job, or 
one quarter of the one year period for construction contemplated under the Contract. The 
Court finds that such a position is unreasonable and unsupported by the facts. 
12. The Court concludes that the proper and appropriate measure of the benefit 
conferred upon Defendants is the pro-rata portion-e£-the fee previously agreed in the Contract. 
Based upon the testimony of Defendants expert witness, one-tenth of construction 
contemplated by the Contract was completed and as a result, Plaintiff conferred a benefit upon 
Defendants in the amount of $10,000. 
13. The Court concludes that the Defendants suffered no damage as a result of 
Plaintiffs failure to supply the required proof of insurance. As a result, no reduction to 
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Plaintiffs recovery should be made in Defendants' favor for such element of the breach of 
Contract. 
14. The Court concludes that Defendants did suffer damage resulting from 
construction mistakes made while Plaintiff was the general contractor. The damage resulting 
from such construction mistakes is the amount of $4,359, which amount should be deducted 
from any amounts otherwise owing to the Plaintiff. 
15. On January 21, 1995, Judge Glenn Iwasaki of this Court entered Judgment in 
favor of Defendants relating to attorneys fees incurred in the prior dismissal of the mechanic's 
lien and bonding statute claims. The current balance of such Judgment is $2,170 and such 
amount should also be deducted from any amounts otherwise owing to the Plaintiff. As a 
result, such prior Judgment should be deemed satisfied. 
16. Except as set forth above, Defendants suffered no additional damage resulting 
from Plaintiffs breach of the Contract and there are no other deductions applicable to 
amounts otherwise owing to the Plaintiff. 
17. Negotiation of the disputed lumbeH5ftl left over from prior contractor was not 
within the scope of the Contract. 
18. The Court concludes that with respect to the inventorying and negotiation of a 
settlement on the disputed prior lumber bill, Plaintiff conferred a benefit upon the Defendants 
in the amount of $5,500, which benefit is in addition to the benefit conferred by Plaintiffs' 
completion of ten percent of the construction. The Court concludes that Defendants were 
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aware of Plaintiffs actions with respect thereto and that it would be unjust to allow 
Defendants to retain such benefit without payment of a reasonable fee to Plaintiff for such 
benefit. Accordingly, the Court finds that a fee of one-half the savings on the lumber bill, or 
$2,750, is fair and reasonable under the circumstances. The Court finds this result particularly 
fair and reasonable inasmuch as the Court has deducted from Plaintiffs recovery the cost of 
extra materials Plaintiff ordered for the job which were ultimately found to be unnecessary. 
19. Plaintiff should also be entitled to post-judgment interest as allowed by law 
from and after the entry of Judgment. No pre-judgment interest is appropriate under Utah 
law. 
20. Plaintiff should also be entitled to its costs of court incurred in prosecuting this 
action in the amount of $542.40. 
DATED this / / _ _ day of / 7 ^ * ~ ^ , 1996. 
BY THE COURT 
^ ^ 2 -
Homff* Wilkinson 
Third District Court Judge 
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Civil No. 10870 
This matter was tried to the Court on December 18 and 19, 1991 and January 30, 
1992. Having considered the evidence, testimony and exhibits produced at trial, and the 
arguments of counsel, the Court previously entered its original Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, as well as a Judgment on October 6, 1992. Defendants subsequently 
appealed the Court's Findings, Conclusions and Judgment. 
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On May 24, 1994, the Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision reversing the Court's 
prior decision and remanding the matter to this Court for additional consideration. 
Pursuant to motion of the Plaintiff that the Court enter Amended Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Amended Judgment pursuant to the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, this Court has carefully reviewed the pleadings and documents on file herein, 
including the transcript of proceedings at trial. The Court has further reconsidered its original 
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment pursuant to the direction of the Utah Court of Appeals' 
decision dated May 24, 1994. Also, on November 21, 1995, this Court further considered 
oral argument by counsel for the parties on Plaintiffs motion to reconsider the matter. 
The Court having now entered its Amended Findings of Fact and Amended 
Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is granted Judgment against the Defendants in the amount of 
$6,763.40. Such amount represents the amount of $13,292.40 ($10,000 earned by the 
Plaintiff for services rendered in directing and supervising 1/10th of the construction of 
Defendants' residence, $2,750.00 as the reasonable value of Plaintiff s services involving 
negotiations for payment of a disputed lumber bill incurred by a prior contractor, and $542.40 
in costs of court expended by Plaintiff in this matter) offset by the following credits to 
Defendants in the total amount of $6,529.00: 
2 
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a. the sum of $1,800.00 which represents Defendants' costs in repairing 
Plaintiffs faulty construction of Defendants' east side retaining wall; 
b. the sum of $2,000.00 which represents Defendants' costs in repairing 
Plaintiffs faulty construction of Defendants' west side concrete steps; 
c. the sum of $559.00 which represents Defendants' costs caused by 
Plaintiffs ordering three unnecessary materials; and 
d. the sum of $2,170.00 representing the current balance (including 
accrued interest) of a prior Judgment rendered against Plaintiff January 23, 1995 by 
Judge Glenn Iwasaki in Defendants' favor relating to attorney's fees and costs of 
Defendants' prior successful Motion for Summary Judgment on the mechanic's lien 
and bonding statute causes of action. As a result of this credit, the prior Judgment of 
January 23, 1995 is satisfied. 
2. Plaintiff is further entitled to interest on its Judgment at the legal rate 
applicable to judgments from and after the date of entry hereof. 
3. Defendants' counterclaims are herebyuiismissed with prejudice. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on this ,2f day of April, 1996,1 caused to be hand delivered 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED JUDGMENT to the following: 
Spencer E. Austin, Esq. 
William J. Evans, Esq. 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
STANLEY M. KURZET, an 
Individual; STANLEY M. KURZET 
and ANNE L. KURZET, as 
Trustees for the Kurzet Family 
Trust; THE KURZET FAMILY 




AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 90-03-10870 
* * * * * * * 
This matter was tried to the Court on December 18 and 19, 
1991 and on January 30, 1992. Having considered the evidence, 
testimony and exhibits produced at trial, and the arguments of 
counsel, the Court entered its original Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment on October 6, 1992. Defendants 
appealed the Court's findings, conclusions and judgment that were 
in favor of plaintiff. 
On May 24, 1994, the Utah Court of Appeals entered its 
decision reversing this Court's decision in favor of plaintiff and 




On January 23, 1995, Judge Glenn Iwasaki of this Court 
entered judgment in favor of defendants in the amount of $1,937.50 
for attorneys' fees for successfully defending plaintiff's claims 
under the mechanic's lien and the bond statutes. 
On July 25, 1995, defendants filed a Motion for Entry of 
Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc and a supporting memorandum. In response, 
on August 24, 1995, plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of 
Additional and Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment, and a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc. At the same time, plaintiff filed 
a Motion to Set Aside the Court's Prior Order Dismissing the 
Mechanic's Lien Cause of Action and Resulting Judgment for 
Attorney's Fees in Favor of Defendants. In response to plaintiff's 
Motion to Set Aside the Prior Order Dismissing the Mechanic's Lien 
Cause of Action, defendants filed a Memorandum in Opposition and a 
Motion for Sanctions under Rule 11. Plaintiff subsequently 
withdrew that Motion. 
On November 21, 1995, this Court heard and considered 
oral argument by counsel for the parties on issues relating to 
defendants' Motion for Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc, plaintiff's 
Motion for Entry of Additional and Amended Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law and defendants' Motion for Sanctions Under Rule 
11. The Court acknowledges that it never read the original 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and that they were 
inadequate. Pursuant to the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
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this Court desires to clarify its findings, conclusions and 
decision based upon the evidence of record. 
The following Amended Findings of Fact and Amended 
Conclusions of Law supersede the original findings and conclusions 
entered by the court prior to defendants' appeal. 
Accordingly, the Court now makes and enters the 
following: 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the parties' intended to and 
did enter into a written contract wherein plaintiff agreed to act 
as the general contractor and to oversee the construction of 
defendants' residence in Park City, Utah. 
2. The Court finds that defendant Stanley M. Kurzet 
drafted the written contract. 
3. The Court finds that the contract between the 
parties provided that plaintiff would complete construction on 
defendants' residence within one year and, in return, defendants 
would pay plaintiff $100,000 consideration for plaintiff's general 
contractor services in directing and supervising the construction, 
and $22 per hour for plaintiff's own hands-on labor. 
4. The Court finds that the contract between the 
parties does not address the measure of damages in the event of 
default by either party. 
5. The Court finds that defendants had experienced 
problems with prior contractors on the residence, and that 
plaintiff was aware that defendants already had terminated two 
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earlier general contractors for unsatisfactory performance. 
Plaintiff was also aware that defendant Stanley M. Kurzet ("Mr. 
Kurzet") was a meticulous and demanding individual and would 
require exacting performance of the contract. 
6. The Court finds that plaintiff's employees performed 
hands-on labor on the project and were paid for such work by 
defendants. The court also finds that plaintiff commenced acting 
in the capacity of general contractor. Plaintiff received no 
compensation for general contractor services. 
7. The Court finds that the parties intended and the 
contract provided for plaintiff to provide defendants with evidence 
of adequate liability insurance covering its work pursuant to the 
contract. Such evidence of insurance was to have been provided by 
plaintiff within 10 days of execution of the contract. 
8. The Court finds that plaintiff represented to 
defendants that plaintiff had one million dollars in liability 
insurance coverage in force at the time the parties entered into 
the contract on July 3, 1990, that defendants wanted four to five 
million dollars in coverage, and that plaintiff later discovered 
its policy was only for $300,000 coverage, and that the policy had 
been canceled on October 24, 1989. 
9. The Court finds that in a memorandum of July 20, 
1990 from defendants to plaintiff, which was delivered to Mr. Kent, 
defendants notified plaintiff that plaintiff had not yet provided 
the necessary certificate evidencing insurance coverage and that 
defendants required such evidence under the terms of the contract. 
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10. The Court finds that plaintiff did not subsequently 
provide the required Certificate of Insurance to defendants. 
11. The Court finds that defendants terminated 
plaintiff's services on October 2, 1990. 
12. The Court finds that plaintiff did not give the 
construction project the attention that was necessary under the 
contract. In particular, the Court finds that plaintiff's attitude 
of being on the job, plaintiff's taking care of things in a timely 
manner, getting things done, seeing that they were done, seeing 
that things were moving along, and answering subcontractor's 
questions were not performed as required. 
13. The Court finds that during the three-month period 
that the contract was in effect, Mr. Kent of the plaintiff, was on 
the construction site approximately thirty (3 0) hours per week. 
The Court finds that Mr. Kent is not a licensed contractor, and the 
duties he performed involved hands-on labor, for which he was paid 
in full by defendants. 
14. The Court finds that Mr. Richard Allen of the 
plaintiff was not regularly on the job, but he spoke with Mr. 
Kurzet about two times per week by telephone. 
15. The Court finds that during the three-month period 
that the contract was in effect, plaintiff performed some general 
contractor services including hiring of some subcontractors and 
getting bids on retaining walls and windows. The Court further 
finds that these services were inadequately performed, and that the 
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construction performed by some of the subcontractors under 
plaintiff's direction also was inadequate. 
16. The Court finds that during the time the contract 
between plaintiff and defendants was in effect, the residence 
progressed from a concrete slab to a point where most of the 
framing was complete. The Court finds that 10% of the construction 
project contemplated by the contract was completed during the time 
plaintiff was general contractor, regardless of whether plaintiff 
performed its duties under the contract. 
17. The Court finds that defendant Mr. Kurzet was 
regularly on the jobsite, as often as much as six (6) hours a day, 
and that he personally observed the progress on the home. The 
Court also finds that Mr. Kurzet does not credit plaintiff with 
having advanced the construction, but rather credits one of the 
subcontractors that Mr. Kurzet hired and that plaintiff approved as 
having completed 10% of the residence during the period of time 
that plaintiff was general contractor. 
18. The Court finds that after commencing its duties 
under the contract, plaintiff inventoried and counted all the 
lumber at the site which had been ordered by a prior contractor. 
The Court finds that plaintiff advised Mr. Kurzet that such lumber 
which had been priced at $28,000 was, in fact, worth about $22,500. 
Mr. Kurzet instructed plaintiff to offer the vendor $22,500. The 
vendor accepted that amount in settlement of the dispute with 
regard to the value of the lumber. 
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19. The court finds that the duties of general 
contractor under the Contract did not include counting lumber at 
the site which had been ordered by a prior contractor. The court 
finds, however, that plaintiff conferred a benefit on defendants by 
counting the lumber and offering a lesser amount in settlement of 
the dispute regarding the value of that lumber; that defendants 
appreciated the benefits so conferred by plaintiff in that 
defendants acknowledge that they saved $5,500 as a result of 
plaintiff performing such services; and that it would be unjust to 
allow defendants to retain the benefit without fairly compensating 
plaintiff for its services. The court finds that the reasonable 
value of plaintiff's services in counting lumber at the site and 
offering the vendor a sum less than the price at which the lumber 
had been voiced can be determined by estimating the amount of time 
plaintiff spent in performing such services, and awarding plaintiff 
an hourly rate of $22 per hour, the rate agreed by the parties to 
be payable for on-hands labor. The court finds that 20 hours is a 
sufficient time for plaintiff to spend counting lumber and 
negotiating a reduction of the price and that the value of the 
benefit conferred on defendants, therefore, is $440.00. 
20. The Court finds that some construction mistakes 
occurred during the construction for which plaintiff was 
responsible, causing defendants' subsequent damages for repairs, 
etc., in the total amount of $4,359 detailed as follows: 
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a. The sum of $1,800 representing the cost of 
repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of defendants' east side 
retaining wall; 
b. The sum of $2,000 representing the cost of 
repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of defendant's west side 
concrete steps; and 
c. The sum of $559 representing the cost of 
plaintiff's ordering three unnecessary "glue-lam" beams. 
21. The Court finds that award to defendants embodied in 
the Original Judgment dated October 6, 1992, in the amount of 
$4,359.00 was not appealed from, nor was it disturbed on appeal, 
nor has it been disturbed by these amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. The Court finds, therefore, that judgment 
should be entered Nunc Pro Tunc as of October 6, 1992, in favor of 
defendants in the amount of $4,359.00. The Court also finds that 
interest on said judgment should run at 5.13% from and after 
October 6, 1992 until paid. 
22. The Court finds that plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside 
the Court's Prior Order Dismissing the Mechanic's Lien Cause of 
Action and Resulting Judgment for Attorney Fees in Favor of 
Defendants was without justification in law or fact, plaintiff 
having not raised that issue on appeal, and that plaintiff had no 
cause to bring the motion back before this Court on remand and to 
do so was a violation of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
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From the foregoing Amended Findings of Fact, the Court 
now makes and enters the following 
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that the parties entered into a 
valid and binding contract on July 3, 1990 for the construction of 
defendants7 residence in Park City, Utah. Under the terms thereof, 
plaintiff was obligated to perform certain services and duties as 
general contractor, and defendants were obligated to pay plaintiff 
an hourly wage for hands-on labor, and $100,000 upon completion of 
the project for plaintiff's services as general contractor. 
2. The Court concludes that given the amount of the 
contract and the costs of the construction, plaintiff had a duty to 
inquire into the adequacy of its insurance coverage for the 
project, but did not do so. 
3. The Court concludes that plaintiff's failure to 
promptly provide evidence of adequate liability insurance was a 
material breach of the contract. 
4. The Court concludes that defendants were justified 
in terminating plaintiff's services under the contract for 
plaintiff's breach of its obligation to promptly provide evidence 
of adequate liability insurance. 
5. The Court concludes that, given the amount of the 
contract and the fact that plaintiff knew in advance that 
defendants would be meticulous, demanding, and would require exact 
performance of the contract, plaintiff had a duty to be on the job, 
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take care of things in a timely manner, answer subcontractor's 
questions, and move the construction forward. 
6. The Court concludes that plaintiff's failure to 
regularly be on the job, take care of things in a timely manner, to 
move the construction forward, and to give the project the 
attention that was required, was a material breach of the contract. 
7. The Court concludes that defendants were justified 
in terminating plaintiff's services under the contract for 
plaintiff's failure to give the construction project the attention 
that was required under the contract. 
8. The Court concludes that defendants were not in 
breach of the contract in any way. 
9. The Court concludes that because plaintiff had not 
substantially completed its duties under the contract at the time 
of termination, plaintiff is not entitled to recover under the 
contract. 
10. The Court concludes that Mr. Kurzet did not realize 
or appreciate any benefit as a result of plaintiff's general 
contractor services, but that Mr. Kurzet credits the efforts of the 
subcontractor hired by Mr. Kurzet with completing 10% of the 
construction during the time the contract was in effect between 
plaintiff and defendants. 
11. The Court concludes that although 10% of the project 
was completed while plaintiff was acting as general contractor, 
that 10% completion was not attributable to plaintiff's efforts. 
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12. The Court concludes that plaintiff has not 
demonstrated that it conferred any benefit upon defendants through 
undertaking duties as general contractor, or that defendants 
realized or appreciated any such benefit. 
13. The Court concludes that under the circumstances, 
plaintiff is not entitled to receive any payment from defendants 
for general contractor services based on a theory of unjust 
enrichment or quantum meruit. 
14. The Court concludes that defendants suffered no 
damage as a result of plaintiff's failure to supply the required 
proof of insurance. As a result, defendants are not entitled to 
any recovery for such element of plaintiff's breach of the 
contract. 
15. The Court concludes that with respect to the 
inventorying and negotiation of settlement on the disputed prior 
lumber bill, it was not plaintiff's responsibility under the 
contract to inventory and negotiate such settlements. The Court 
concludes that plaintiff conferred a benefit on defendant with 
respect thereto, that defendants were aware of plaintiff's having 
conferred such benefit, and that it would be unjust to allow 
defendants to retain such benefit without payment of a reasonable 
fee to plaintiff. The Court concludes that $22 an hour is a 
reasonable fee for inventorying lumber and negotiating the 
reduction in price, and that 2 0 hours would be a reasonable time to 
spend to inventory lumber and negotiate the price reduction. 
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Accordingly, the Court concludes that $44 0 is a reasonable sum to 
compensate plaintiff for such services. 
16. The Court concludes that defendants did suffer 
damages resulting from construction mistakes while plaintiff was 
the general contractor. The damage resulting from such 
construction mistakes is $4,359, which represents $1,800 in the 
costs of repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of the east side 
retaining wall, $2,000 for costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty 
construction of the west side concrete steps, and $559 for the 
costs of plaintiff's ordering three unnecessary "glue-lam" beams. 
17. The Court concludes that on October 6, 1992, 
defendants were entitled to $4,359 for damages resulting from 
construction mistakes while plaintiff was general contractor. The 
Court further concludes that plaintiff did not appeal from that 
award of damages, the Court of Appeals did not disturb that award 
of damages, an entry of judgment, therefore, is proper as of 
October 6, 1992, with interest to run at the rate of 5.13% from and 
after that date. 
18. The court concludes that defendants are entitled to 
sanctions under Rule 11 for plaintiff having filed its Motion to 
Set Aside the Court's Prior Order Dismissing the Mechanic's Lien 
Cause of Action and Resulting Judgment For Attorneys' Fees in Favor 
of the Defendants. 
19. The Court concludes that defendants are entitled to 
post-judgment interest as allowed by law from and after entry of 
judgment. No pre-judgment interest is appropriate in this case. 
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20. The Court concludes that plaintiff is not the 
prevailing party in this action and that each party should bear its 
own costs of court and attorneys' fees incurred in this action. 
21. The Court concludes that the judgment in favor of 
defendants in the amount of $1,937.50 for attorney fees entered by 
Judge Glenn Iwasaki on January 23, 1995, is unaffected by these 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
DATED this day of , 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this p^v^ day of May, 1996, I 
caused to be hand-delivered, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing [DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED] AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to: 
Bruce J. Nelson 
Allen Nelson Rasmussen & Christensen 
215 South State #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM G 
SPENCER E. AUSTIN (0150) 
WILLIAM J. EVANS (5276) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY,' INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STANLEY M. KURZET, an 
Individual; STANLEY M. KURZET 
and ANNE L. KURZET, as 
Trustees for the Kurzet Family 
Trust; THE KURZET FAMILY 
TRUST; and JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 
10, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * 
This matter was tried to the Court on December 18 and 19, 
1991 and on January 30, 1992. Having considered the evidence, 
testimony and exhibits produced at trial, and the arguments of 
counsel, the Court entered its original Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment on October 6, 1992. Defendants 
appealed the Court's findings, conclusions and judgment that were 
in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff did not appeal those findings, 
conclusions and judgment that were in favor of defendants. On May 
24, 1994, the Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision reversing 
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this Court's decision in favor of plaintiff and remanding the 
matter to this Court for additional consideration. 
On January 23, 1995, Judge Glen Iwasaki of this Court 
entered judgment in favor of defendants in the amount of $1,937.50 
for attorneys' fees for successfully defending plaintiff's claims 
under the Mechanic's Lien and the Bond statutes. On July 25, 1995, 
defendants filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc along 
with a supporting memorandum. In response, plaintiff submitted a 
Motion for Entry of Additional and Amended Findings of Facts, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment, a Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion for Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc, and a 
Motion to Set Aside the Court's Prior Order Dismissing the 
Mechanic's Lien Cause of Action and Resulting Judgment for 
Attorneys' Fees in Favor of Defendants. Defendants responded with 
a Memorandum in Opposition and a Motion for Sanctions under Rule 
11. On November 21, 1995, this Court heard and considered oral 
argument by counsel for the parties on issues relating to all of 
the motions and memoranda submitted from and after July 25, 1995. 
The Court, having considered the motions, memoranda and all 
supporting papers of the parties, and having heard oral argument on 
those motions on November 21, 1995, and having reconsidered its 
original findings, conclusions and judgment pursuant to the 
direction of the Utah Court of Appeals' decision dated May 24, 
1994, the Court, having now entered its Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
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1. Defendants are hereby granted judgment as of October 
6, 1992, against plaintiffs in the amount of $4,359, which 
represents $1,800 in the cost of repairing plaintiff's faulty 
construction of the eastside retaining wall, plus $2,000 for costs 
in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of the westside 
concrete steps, plus $559 for the costs of plaintiff's ordering 
three unnecessary "glue-lam" beams. 
2. The award to defendants is offset by a credit to 
plaintiff in the amount of $440 representing the reasonable value 
of plaintiff's services involving negotiations for payment of a 
disputed lumber bill incurred by a prior contractor. 
3. Defendants are entitled to interest on said judgment 
at 5.13 percent per annum from and after October 6, 1992. 
4. Defendants are awarded $500 representing a 
reasonable attorney's fee incurred in preparing a response to 
plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside the Court's Prior Order Dismissing 
the Mechanic's Lien Cause of Action and Resulting Judgment for 
Attorneys' Fees in Favor of Defendants, which motion was filed in 
violation of Rule 11. 
5. The judgment in favor of defendants in the amount of 
$1,937.50 entered against plaintiff January 23, 1995, by Judge Glen 
Iwasaki relating to attorney's fees and costs, it is unaffected by 
this Judgment. All of plaintiff's remaining causes of action and 
all of defendants' remaining counterclaims are hereby dismissed 
with prejudice. 
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DATED this day of , 1996 
BY THE COURT: 
Homer F. Wilkinson, Third District 
Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Bruce J. Nelson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Spencer E. Austin 
William J. Evans 
Attorneys for Defendants 
237614 1 
il05 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this w\^ day of May, 1996, I 
caused to be hand-delivered, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing [PROPOSED] AMENDED JUDGMENT to: 
Bruce J. Nelson 
Allen Nelson Rasmussen & Christensen 
215 South State #900 






























IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
#%Ol <& 
BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC., 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
STANLEY M. KURZET, AN INDI-
VIDUAL; STANLEY M. KURZET AND 
ANNE L. KURZET, AS TRUSTEES FOR: 
THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; THE 
KURZET FAMILY TRUST; AND JOHN : 
DOES 1-10, 
DEFENDANTS. 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF 
HEARING ON MOTIONS FOR 
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS; ENTRY 
OF JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC; 
AND RULE 11 SAKCXLQMS. 
F l LE D 
DEC 2 0 1995 
ClerKot Summit Uounty 
By. 
CASE NO. 900310870 CV 
HON. HOMER F. WILKINSON 
Deputy Clerk 
Jtrffl -
BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE 21ST DAY OF 
NOVEMBER. 1995. THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR 
HEARING IN COURTROOM NO. 502 OF THE COURTS BUILDING, 
METROPOLITAN HALL OF JUSTICE, 240 EAST 400 SOUTH, SALT LAKE CITY, 
UTAH, BEFORE THE HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, JUDGE IN THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH. 
APPEARANCES 
BRUCE J. NELSON. ATTORNEY-AT-LAW. ALLEN NELSON 
RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN, 215 SOUTH STATE, SUITE 900, SALT LAKE 
CITY, UTAH 84111 TELEPHONE 531-8400 APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
SPENCER E. AUSTIN. ATTORNEY-AT-LAW. PARSONS 
BEHLE & LATIMER, 201 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITE 1800, POST OFFICE 
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1 OPINION THAT WHAT I GRANTED FOUR YEARS AGO, WHAT I DID WAS 
2 CORRECT. 
3 I'M STILL OF THAT OPINION. OF COURSE ANY 
4 MODIFICATIONS TO THE LUMBER CONTRACT, AS FAR AS THAT IS 
5 CONCERNED, I THINK THE POINT IS WELL TAKEN, THAT I THINK BOTH 
6 PARTIES HAVE THE BENEFIT OF THAT. 
7 AS FAR AS THE MOTION NUNC PRO TUNC, I THINK 
8 THAT BECOME MOOT. THAT BECOMES PART OF MY DECISION AGAIN, 
9 MY JUDGMENT. I THINK THE INTEREST BEGINS TO RUN ON BOTH OF 
10 THEM AT THE SAME TIME, AND THAT IT'S THERE. I THINK HFS STILL 
11 ENTITLED TO THAT OFFSET, BUT I WOULD NOT GRANT A SEPARATE 
12 JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC WHERE THEY COULD RECEIVE WITHOUT 
13 THE BENEFIT OF THE OFFSET. 
14 OF COURSE THE PLAINTIFF HAS WITHDRAWN HIS 
15 MOTION REGARDING THE MECHANIC'S LIEN. THE PLAINTIFF HAS ASKED 
16 FOR SANCTIONS--
17 MR. NELSON: THE DEFENDANT, YOUR HONOR? 
18 THE COURT: I'M SORRY, THE DEFENDANT ASKED FOR 
19 SANCTIONS. WELL, THIS GETS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. I DON'T THINK 
20 THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION--I AGREE WITH THE DEFENDANT THAT 
21 THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION, WHEN THEY DID NOT APPEAL, THAT HE HAD 
22 ANY CAUSE TO BRING THE MOTION BACK BEFORE THE COURT, AND 
23 THAT THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPEALED. THERE'S NO DOUBT IN THE 
24 COURT'S MIND ON THAT. 
25 WHETHER I WAS OR NOT IN THAT, I THINK I WAS, BUT 
51 
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1 I DON'T REMEMBER WHY I RULED THAT WAY NOW, BUT I THINK I WAS 
2 RIGHT. 
3 THE ONLY THING THE PLAINTIFF WENT TO WAS 
4 HAVING TO FILE I GUESS A MEMORANDUM STATING THAT IT WAS ON 
5 APPEAL OR THAT HE SHOULD HAVE ASKED FOR IT ON APPEAL. I DON'T 
6 THINK THAT ADDITIONAL TIME WAS SPENT THERE TODAY. 
7 I THINK THE ATTORNEYS WOULD BE--THE ATTORNEYS 
8 FEES WOULD BE VERY NOMINAL. THE COURT OF COURSE-AND I'M 
9 SAYING THIS, TOO: I HAVE SAID THIS, BUT I'M GOING TO SAY IT AGAIN, 
10 THAT I THINK THE DEFENDANT WAS WRONG--AND I'M NOT OVERRULING 
11 IT; IT'S NOT BEFORE ME--I THINK HE WAS WRONG IN BRINGING THE 
12 MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS BEFORE AN ADDITIONAL JUDGE, AND I NOTED 
13 THAT COUNSEL ARGUED IT WAS IMPROPER. 
14 AND OF COURSE THE COURT PROCEEDED. I'M NOT 
15 FINDING FAULT WITH THE DEFENDANT FOR GETTING THE AWARD; THE 
16 JUDGE SAW FIT TO ORDER IT, BUT I THINK IT WAS IMPROPER FOR HIM 
17 TO BRING IT BEFORE HIM. 
18 BUT IN A CASE OF THIS TYPE, AND MAYBE TO SAVE 
19 ATTORNEYS FEES, THE ATTORNEYS -J&OULD OFFSET EACH OTHER ON 
20 THAT. YOU COULD SAY--I GUESS WHAT I'M SAYING IS THAT THIS CASE 
21 HAS GONE ON TOO MUCH AS FAR AS TOO MUCH IT SEEMS LIKE IN 
22 PERSONALITIES. I'M GOING TO DENY THE MOTION FOR SANCTIONS. I 
23 JUST DON'T THINK THAT THEY'RE NECESSARY AS FAR AS THE CASE IS 
24 CONCERNED. ANY QUESTIONS? 
25|| MR. NELSON: I THINK YOU HAVE BEEN CLEAR, BUT I 
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ADDENDUM I 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; 
sanctions. 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attor-
ney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name 
who is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's address 
also shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign 
his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when other-
wise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or 
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer 
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one 
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature 
of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the 
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, informa-
tion, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and 
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not 
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is 
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other 
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or 
both, an appropriate sanction, jsrhich may include an order to pay to the other 
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of 
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
